Angry Manipur

By: C Doungel

The dawn of freedom on 15th August 1947 ushered in the era with different connotations, particularly for Manipur and Naga Hills then. In Naga Hills, A.Z. Phizo declared Naga independence on 14th August ‘47 and launched freedom movement which though was considered for too advanced. For other neighbouring tribes/communities, India’s independence was looked upon as mere passing of power from whiteman (Britishers) to brown-men. Regardless of the polemics thrown around the merger issue of Manipur-whether forced, legal or illegal, it was taken as natural happening at that historical moment. With the euphoria of independence sweeping through the length and breath of India, Manipur tugged in the north-eastern corner accepted it as a fait-accompli because of the common religious ties (particularly of Hinduism) and also having faith in the safeguards provided in the merger agreement. Apart from provisions for more opportunities of employment and direct attention through central rule, the king was provided with privy purse. Manipur was made a part ‘C’ state and later a Union territory albeit sans provision to take care of hill affairs in place of Hills durbar.

Meanwhile Naga freedom movement in Naga Hills gained momentum which culminated in eruption of violent rebellion in 1956. Pandit Nehru who was then the Prime Minister dealt with much benevolence. Naga Hills was amalgamated with Tuensang Area in NEFA in 1957 and placed under External Affairs ministry. Statehood was given to Nagaland in 1963 after 16 points agreement was signed with Govt. of India in 1960. One point of the agreement provided that contiguous Naga areas could merge with consent of the people. Manipur Govt was not consulted while Assam could have been aware as Shree. B.P Chaliha was a member of Peace Committee headed by Shree. Jai Prakash Narayan. Kukis made feeble protests but they were not in any reckoning.

Insurgency in Nagaland did not stop. Rather, it spilled over to Manipur resulting in extension of ceasefire to Tamenglong and Ukhrul sub-divisions (now districts) and Mao sub-divisions (now Senapati segment). Momentum of pressure for merger receded for sometime but simmering discontentment grew in Manipur and Assam. These ultimately gave birth to UNLF/PREPAK/PLA/ULFA/KNA/KNF to counter the threat to Manipur and Assam territorial integrity. Mizos, who also realised that only violent revolt draws quicker attention and yields reward, took a similar course.

On the political front, pressure was mounting for statehood to be conferred to Manipur/Tripura. But whenever they pleaded their case before Government of India, stating that they are equally deserving, the stock answer they were given was that Nagaland is a unique and special case. Statehood to Manipur was belatedly given in 1972 and in the first Assembly general election, Naga integration was an important issue.

Mutually deterrent nature of insurgent groups inherent in their birth in Nagaland, Assam and Manipur, having created trans-border problem have thus grown more and more complex. Though NSCN (IM) is the mother of most insurgent groups, it has now become difficult for a single group to either take unilateral decision or thrash out solution with government by isolating the others. In fact, the others harbour deep-seated resentment for being relegated to secondary status despite the fact that they once considered themselves more civilized and advanced. They feel that Nagas of Manipur are lured by better opportunities available by grant of statehood to Nagaland first. They feel ignored when decisions concerning Manipur are taken behind their back. They are therefore coming out in open challenge of NSCN (IM) whom they feel are placed on a higher pedestal. They feel that they have to stand up for their wounded feelings and hurt pride. Thus there is a nagging desire to prove that they can be equally deadly.

Having no more faith that their case will be dealt with in a fair and just manner, even the civil society has joined in being belligerent this deeply embedded distrust would largely explain the psyche why such violent agitations erupted when there was extention of Cease-fire with NSCN (IM) “without territorial limits” in 2000 (which was late withdrawn) and on the killing of Thangjam Manorama in 2003 etc. to cite few examples.

Thus, violent agitations in Manipur are sometimes organised by civil organisations with backing of armed groups. At the same time, loyalties being on ethnic and communal lines, demonisation of one group is used to run down the other and breed violence. Common economic interest which can benefit all in the region are relegated to the background. The fragile law and order most of the time gets such a beating that they often break down completely. In the chaos, mobs get organised into some kind of “posse comitatus” in the form of JACs, Meira Paibis or AMADA etc. who themselves at times dispense justice.

The security forces no doubt have to perform very odious task but those in authority cannot always take the line of least resistance. It is understandable that those facing bullets in battlefields and exposed to risk of life always may not be in a position to “put on their best manners as in a dinner party”. All the same, there should not be complete breakdown of discipline or sense of fairness should not be cast away. The Armed Forces Special Power Act which is a lawless-law provides some legal protection (I wish that this abnoxious law is lifted as early as possible). Most human rights abuses by State Forces or Army including AR take place in violation of even this law.

As of today, the insurgency situation appears fluid and it will continue to remain so for some coming years. The state administration as also the Armed Forces or Para-military forces have to ensure that blatant violations of human rights do not take place.

Most hill based insurgent groups had entered into agreement with the Army for suspension of operations which to some extent is a sign of progress in the right direction. Some have political demands but others have not spelt out any. Rather some have earned notoriety mostly in kidnapping for ransom. Should they be treated as same?. Further, allegations are there about State Forces/Assam Rifles units protecting some of these groups because of gainful mutual interests. It is indeed a good thing that Army/ARs undertake many civic actions which give some healing touch but they are no substitute for being professional, firm and just. For, insurgency cannot be controlled by handing out candies alone.

The writer is a former member of the Manipur Legislative Assembly, and a member of the All India Congress Committee.

A welcome respite in India's bloody northeast

By: Tangpua Siamchinthang

At last, there seems a glimmer of hope in India's northeast. With the lifting of the ban on the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN (I-M)), the stage has been set for direct talks in New Delhi between the hitherto outlawed insurgent group and the government of India.

The talks, scheduled to start in the Indian capital in mid-December, represent an important step forward in the quest for a negotiated settlement to the decades-long Naga insurgency. The de-proscription of the NSCN (I-M) will enable its top leaders Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu to return to India. The two have been living in self-imposed exile for the last 37 years and while they did visit Nagaland in 1999, their visit to Delhi for the talks will be an official one.

The NSCN (I-M) has agreed to come to the negotiating table after Delhi decided to meet two conditions it laid down. One was the lifting of the ban on the organization and the other, the direct involvement of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani in the forthcoming talks. It is with government representatives that the NSCN leaders have been talking to so far, although Vajpayee (as well as his predecessors Narasimha Rao and H D Deve Gowda) met them in September 1998 in Paris and again in December last year in Osaka. Direct talks at the highest level signal that the negotiations have made significant progress in addressing the "Naga problem", as it is known.

Naga separatism predates Indian independence. The Naga National Council (NNC) pledged in 1950 to establish a sovereign Naga state and assumed the form of an armed struggle by 1952. Since then, the insurgency has gathered a ferocity that Delhi has found hard to tackle.

In 1975, the NNC leader Angami Zapu Phizo signed an accord with Delhi under which the NNC accepted the Indian Constitution and agreed to come overground and surrender its weapons. A faction within the NNC that included Muivah, Swu and S S Khaplang, rejected the accord and broke away to form the NSCN in 1980. Further inter-tribal rivalry within the NSCN led to its split in 1988, with the NSCN (I-M) emerging the dominant faction. The ferocity with which the various insurgent groups have battled each other has in fact been far more serious than their battle against the Indian security forces.

It was only in the mid-1990s that Delhi seriously resumed the dialogue process with the Nagas. Several rounds of talks with the NSCN (I-M) leaders resulted in a ceasefire agreement being signed in 1997. While the ceasefire has held, progress on the negotiations front was slow, with analysts frequently dismissing the peace process as a non-starter. The announcement of talks in Delhi signals that what was believed to be a deadlocked dialogue process that was dragging on inconclusively is still very much alive and raised hopes of a political solution to the Naga insurgency. However, the process is fraught with difficulties.

While the lifting of the ban on the NSCN (I-M) has been welcomed by the Naga Hoho - an apex body of the Nagas -- and a number of civil society groups, powerful factions remain unhappy with Delhi's decision. The NSCN (Khaplang), which has been locked in bloody warfare with the NSCN (I-M), is opposed to Delhi negotiating with its rival. Although India has been engaging in a parallel peace process with the NSCN (Khaplang), the faction that is led by Muivah and Swu is taken more seriously by the government.

Elected representatives too pose a threat to the peace process. Nagaland's Chief Minister S C Jamir is regarded by the NSCN (I-M) as the main roadblock. Jamir has said that he is not opposed to a negotiated settlement with the NSCN (I-M) and has even revoked the arrest warrants against Muivah and Swu. However, he is said to be close to the NSCN (Khaplang). It is believed that he is not averse to using it to undermine the NSCN (I-M).

Jamir insists that his government, church leaders, the Naga Hoho, village councils and all factions of the underground must be included in the talks. "While this is desirable, it is not workable at this point," responded an official in the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs.

For many politicians, a political settlement of the Naga problem would erode their influence. Keeping the problem festering ensures more funds from the central government. Politicians also fear that once the insurgents come overground and should they enter the electoral arena, they (the politicians) will be sidelined.

New Delhi will have to keep in mind the sensitivities of sections beyond Nagaland's geographic boundaries. The NSCN (I-M) is firm that all Naga-dominated areas that are contiguous to the present boundaries of Nagaland, which were demarcated when it became a state in 1963, be added to the state. The problem is that these Naga-dominated areas include four northern districts of neighboring Manipur, parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

Last year, Manipur witnessed violent protests when Delhi extended its ceasefire with the NSCN (I-M) beyond Nagaland to include the Naga-dominated areas in the neighboring states. The Manipur government has already announced that it would not withdraw arrest warrants it issued against Muivah and Isak. This means the two leaders cannot safely visit Manipur, two-thirds of which is inhabited by Nagas. The talks with the NSCN (I-M) will be closely watched in Manipur and any decision that impacts on Manipur's territorial integrity or the interests of its majority Meitei community is sure to evoke a violent response.

However, it is the extent to which Delhi and the NSCN (I-M) can find common ground that will determine whether the talks will lead to a lasting solution. The NSCN (I-M) continues to maintain that the Naga region was never a part of India. In fact, its leaders frequently point out that they are not fighting for secession, as they have never been a part of the Indian union. They maintain that they are fighting for independence from "Indian occupation" and harken back to a 1951 plebiscite in Naga-dominated areas, in which people overwhelmingly voted for independence from India.

Yet, Swu and Muivah have been making conciliatory noises of late. "We do not demand sovereignty, what we expect is the recognition of the rights of the Nagas," says Swu. This position brightens prospects for a political settlement. But how this will play out with the NSCN (I-M) cadres remains to be seen. The cadres have been indoctrinated for years to believe that nothing short of independence is acceptable. Besides, there is the second-rung of leaders who - unlike Swu and Muivah, who are in their 70s - are middle-aged and have many years of fighting left in them. They could challenge the leadership should it reach a compromise with Delhi.

In 1975, when Phizo signed the Shillong Accord with Delhi, he was challenged by Swu and Muivah, who returned to the jungles to resume the armed struggle against the Indian security forces. For years since then, it was these two who kept the Naga insurgency alive. The question is whether history will repeat itself. Will the second rung challenge Swu and Muivah now if they reach a compromise deal with Delhi? Much will depend on the extent to which they control the cadres.

A lot has changed in Nagaland since 1975. While alienation from India is still acute, there is extreme fatigue with the fighting and the thirst for peace in Nagaland is acute. The conflict has taken a heavy toll in terms of lives and development of the area. Civil society groups have come out in support of the talks. Muivah and Swu seem to have realized that violent struggle has gotten them nowhere. They recognize that the forthcoming talks have opened up a window of opportunity. And with Delhi now determined to find a political solution to the Naga problem, they know that this is an opportune time to reach a settlement.

While this might call for optimism over the future of the talks, the process could unravel easily. The situation has never been more fragile. Successful talks with the NSCN (I-M) could prompt other insurgent groups in the northeast to consider the talks option. At the same time, even one wrong decision by Delhi could trigger off a fresh round of bloodletting - not just in Nagaland, but across the region as well.