By: Tangpua Siamchinthang
At last, there seems a glimmer of hope in India's northeast. With the lifting of the ban on the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN (I-M)), the stage has been set for direct talks in New Delhi between the hitherto outlawed insurgent group and the government of India. The talks, scheduled to start in the Indian capital in mid-December, represent an important step forward in the quest for a negotiated settlement to the decades-long Naga insurgency. The de-proscription of the NSCN (I-M) will enable its top leaders Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu to return to India. The two have been living in self-imposed exile for the last 37 years and while they did visit Nagaland in 1999, their visit to Delhi for the talks will be an official one. The NSCN (I-M) has agreed to come to the negotiating table after Delhi decided to meet two conditions it laid down. One was the lifting of the ban on the organization and the other, the direct involvement of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani in the forthcoming talks. It is with government representatives that the NSCN leaders have been talking to so far, although Vajpayee (as well as his predecessors Narasimha Rao and H D Deve Gowda) met them in September 1998 in Paris and again in December last year in Osaka. Direct talks at the highest level signal that the negotiations have made significant progress in addressing the "Naga problem", as it is known. Naga separatism predates Indian independence. The Naga National Council (NNC) pledged in 1950 to establish a sovereign Naga state and assumed the form of an armed struggle by 1952. Since then, the insurgency has gathered a ferocity that Delhi has found hard to tackle. In 1975, the NNC leader Angami Zapu Phizo signed an accord with Delhi under which the NNC accepted the Indian Constitution and agreed to come overground and surrender its weapons. A faction within the NNC that included Muivah, Swu and S S Khaplang, rejected the accord and broke away to form the NSCN in 1980. Further inter-tribal rivalry within the NSCN led to its split in 1988, with the NSCN (I-M) emerging the dominant faction. The ferocity with which the various insurgent groups have battled each other has in fact been far more serious than their battle against the Indian security forces. It was only in the mid-1990s that Delhi seriously resumed the dialogue process with the Nagas. Several rounds of talks with the NSCN (I-M) leaders resulted in a ceasefire agreement being signed in 1997. While the ceasefire has held, progress on the negotiations front was slow, with analysts frequently dismissing the peace process as a non-starter. The announcement of talks in Delhi signals that what was believed to be a deadlocked dialogue process that was dragging on inconclusively is still very much alive and raised hopes of a political solution to the Naga insurgency. However, the process is fraught with difficulties. While the lifting of the ban on the NSCN (I-M) has been welcomed by the Naga Hoho - an apex body of the Nagas -- and a number of civil society groups, powerful factions remain unhappy with Delhi's decision. The NSCN (Khaplang), which has been locked in bloody warfare with the NSCN (I-M), is opposed to Delhi negotiating with its rival. Although India has been engaging in a parallel peace process with the NSCN (Khaplang), the faction that is led by Muivah and Swu is taken more seriously by the government. Elected representatives too pose a threat to the peace process. Nagaland's Chief Minister S C Jamir is regarded by the NSCN (I-M) as the main roadblock. Jamir has said that he is not opposed to a negotiated settlement with the NSCN (I-M) and has even revoked the arrest warrants against Muivah and Swu. However, he is said to be close to the NSCN (Khaplang). It is believed that he is not averse to using it to undermine the NSCN (I-M). Jamir insists that his government, church leaders, the Naga Hoho, village councils and all factions of the underground must be included in the talks. "While this is desirable, it is not workable at this point," responded an official in the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs. For many politicians, a political settlement of the Naga problem would erode their influence. Keeping the problem festering ensures more funds from the central government. Politicians also fear that once the insurgents come overground and should they enter the electoral arena, they (the politicians) will be sidelined. New Delhi will have to keep in mind the sensitivities of sections beyond Nagaland's geographic boundaries. The NSCN (I-M) is firm that all Naga-dominated areas that are contiguous to the present boundaries of Nagaland, which were demarcated when it became a state in 1963, be added to the state. The problem is that these Naga-dominated areas include four northern districts of neighboring Manipur, parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Last year, Manipur witnessed violent protests when Delhi extended its ceasefire with the NSCN (I-M) beyond Nagaland to include the Naga-dominated areas in the neighboring states. The Manipur government has already announced that it would not withdraw arrest warrants it issued against Muivah and Isak. This means the two leaders cannot safely visit Manipur, two-thirds of which is inhabited by Nagas. The talks with the NSCN (I-M) will be closely watched in Manipur and any decision that impacts on Manipur's territorial integrity or the interests of its majority Meitei community is sure to evoke a violent response. However, it is the extent to which Delhi and the NSCN (I-M) can find common ground that will determine whether the talks will lead to a lasting solution. The NSCN (I-M) continues to maintain that the Naga region was never a part of India. In fact, its leaders frequently point out that they are not fighting for secession, as they have never been a part of the Indian union. They maintain that they are fighting for independence from "Indian occupation" and harken back to a 1951 plebiscite in Naga-dominated areas, in which people overwhelmingly voted for independence from India. Yet, Swu and Muivah have been making conciliatory noises of late. "We do not demand sovereignty, what we expect is the recognition of the rights of the Nagas," says Swu. This position brightens prospects for a political settlement. But how this will play out with the NSCN (I-M) cadres remains to be seen. The cadres have been indoctrinated for years to believe that nothing short of independence is acceptable. Besides, there is the second-rung of leaders who - unlike Swu and Muivah, who are in their 70s - are middle-aged and have many years of fighting left in them. They could challenge the leadership should it reach a compromise with Delhi. In 1975, when Phizo signed the Shillong Accord with Delhi, he was challenged by Swu and Muivah, who returned to the jungles to resume the armed struggle against the Indian security forces. For years since then, it was these two who kept the Naga insurgency alive. The question is whether history will repeat itself. Will the second rung challenge Swu and Muivah now if they reach a compromise deal with Delhi? Much will depend on the extent to which they control the cadres. A lot has changed in Nagaland since 1975. While alienation from India is still acute, there is extreme fatigue with the fighting and the thirst for peace in Nagaland is acute. The conflict has taken a heavy toll in terms of lives and development of the area. Civil society groups have come out in support of the talks. Muivah and Swu seem to have realized that violent struggle has gotten them nowhere. They recognize that the forthcoming talks have opened up a window of opportunity. And with Delhi now determined to find a political solution to the Naga problem, they know that this is an opportune time to reach a settlement. While this might call for optimism over the future of the talks, the process could unravel easily. The situation has never been more fragile. Successful talks with the NSCN (I-M) could prompt other insurgent groups in the northeast to consider the talks option. At the same time, even one wrong decision by Delhi could trigger off a fresh round of bloodletting - not just in Nagaland, but across the region as well.
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