By: Parratt
1. INTRODUCTION
The majority of former colonies may fairly be described as colonial constructs, in that their borders and the ethnic composition of their populations (and thus the resulting stresses of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict) were determined by the historical processes of colonial expansion. India, by contrast, could not unreasonably be called a post-colonial construct (1). Negotiations for its independence involved not only partition (ostensibly on religious grounds) but also the beginnings of the incorporation into the newly independent India of the princely states and other (mostly tribal) territories which were only very loosely administered by Britain. This process was still ongoing in 1975 (with the taking over of Sikkim). Around two fifths of present day India was never directly part of the British Empire, and only joined the Indian Union by processes of negotiation, backed up in several cases by intimidation and military action (2). This process (which came to the attention of the international community specially in the cases of Hyderabad, Kashmir and Goa) also significantly affected the north eastern region of India. Of the seven states in the northeast, only Assam (which then included the present Magalaya) was fully administered by the British. The princely native states of Manipur and Tripura became independent in 1947, and the tribal areas of the Naga Hills (which became the basis of the present Nagaland), Lushai Hills (now Mizoram), and NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) were loosely administered but not fully integrated into British India (3).
The northeastern region in general is in fact sharply different from the remainder of the sub-continent. In contrast to the broad Aryan-Dravidian peoples of the heartlands of India, the peoples of the northeast are ethnically Mongoloid, and the bulk of its peoples migrated into the region from the east. Its languages furthermore are not related to Sanskrit, but belong to the quite different Tibeto-Burman language group. Its cultures, despite influence from the Indian subcontinent, in many ways resemble more those of east Asia. Historically, too, the region was never part of the great empires of the subcontinent, nor was it greatly involved in the Indian Congress struggle for independence. After Indian independence in 1947 ethnic, historical and cultural differences were reinforced by geographical isolation. With the removal of West Bengal to become East Pakistan (and subsequently Bangladesh) the northeast became tenuously linked to the rest of India only by the 14 km wide Siliguri corridor, so that now less than 1% of its borders are with the rest of India. The Congress policy of aggressive integrationism after 1947, paradoxically, reinforced this isolation. Foreign investment is practically non-existent, internal investment very limited, and all communications go through Delhi or Calcutta. Much of the region has been declared a ?restricted area?, foreigners are scarcely permitted access, the international media and human rights organisations are explicitly excluded, and some areas are off limits even to Indian nationals.
This isolation is reinforced by a form of narrow ethnocenticism which assumed the Hindi speaking ?Aryan? tradition represented the only valid form of Indianness. The resulting ?integrationist? policies, which lasted until comparatively recently, thus presssurised a region which is ethnically and linguistically quite different to conform to what has been called the culture of the Hindi cow-belt. While the distinctiveness of the ?Dravidian? south had to be recognised, the peculiarities of the Mongoloid cultures of the north east (which have an equally great cultural history) have never yet been fully acknowledged (4). As Verghese comments: ?the dominant Aryan bent of national thinking has accommodated the Dravidian reality but has yet to appreciate the Mongoloid feature of the Indian ethos? (Verghese (1997:281). It is symptomatic that though the Mongoloid languages are the largest single language group in India, none was listed in the 8th schedule as an official language until as late as 1993, when Manipuri (after years of demonstrations) was finally included.
The claim that India is unified by an underlying Hindu cultural tradition, often used by integrationists, is unconvincing. As far as the northeast is concerned it is only the Brahmaputra valley and the Valley of Manipur which were extensively hinduised. Even in the latter Hinduism is a comparatively recent importation, and Meitei (ie plains people as opposed to hill tribals) society now shows many signs of becoming post-Hindu, as political identity has become entangled with religious identity (5). The hills, which were never hinduised, are today mainly Christian, with Mizoram and Nagaland being around 80% Christian, and Meghalaya also having a large Christian population. Arunachal?s peoples seem largely to have withstood the efforts of Hindu missionaries, and it also has a substantial minority of Chakma Buddhists (resettled there after 1947).
Indian integrationism is based on what one might call the fallacy of concept of the ?mainstream.? Naorem Sanajaoba (1988:262) quotes a telling comment of Sunanda K. Datta-Ray: speaking of the ignorance of Indians in general about the ?Mongolian? heritage of the north east, Datta-Ray writes: ?Deep in the Indian psyche lies the belief, lately encouraged by obscurantist political groups, that Bharat is really Aryavrata, or the Hindi heartland, and that outlying districts which do not conform to its manners, customs, language and religion are colonial possessions and must be ruled as such until they can be absorbed in a superior code.? The Mongoloid peoples of the north east frequently claim that in the rest of the country they are regarded as foreigners and that an attitude of misplaced racial superiority and disdain has characterised their treatment by ?mainstream? Indians. The parochialism of successive Delhi governments and the widespread ignorance about the region, even on the part of educated Indians, has created a ?them and us? mentality on both sides which has been one contributory factor to civil unrest and armed conflict. As late as 1988 one of the Government?s own reports could speak of a ?two way deficit of understanding with the rest of the country.? It is therefore no surprise that an area as large as the north east, separated as it is from the bulk of the subcontinent by its geography, history, ethnicity, languages, and for a majority by its religion, and which was only marginally affected by the independence struggle, should regard itself as not part of the so-called ?mainstream? as defined by the Delhi-wallah.
Unfortunately central governments have deliberately reinforced the marginalisation of the region by a policy of isolation. It is the only area of India for which special permits are required (6). From soon after independence large tracts have been classified as ?disturbed areas? and subject to oppressive military occupation, without however the formal declaration of an emergency.B.K. Roy Burman (1997:26) has pointed out that claims of neo-colonialism are justified and that there has been a sharp suppression of talk of self-determination. Resentment at political subjection, and economic and social neglect, has understandably given rise to protest, both civil and insurgent (7), both peaceful and violent. This has resulted in turn in the attempt by Delhi to impose its will by military force. Some political advance has been made, notably in Mizoram. But half a century of severe military repression has in the main solved nothing, but rather increased a feeling of alienation, even on the part of peace-loving civil populations. There sadly seems to be little political will on either side to create a climate of basic human rights which alone would make development a possibility.
2. CHRISTIANITY IN NAGALAND AND MANIPUR
Protestant Christianity in these states is dominated by the Baptists, and was largely established by the American Baptists, who traditionally have a strongly evangelical and biblicist approach. Catholicism was introduced much later, but has grown in importance largely due to its emphasis on educational work. The removal of foreign missionaries in the 1960s affected the Baptists more than the Catholics, who rely upon a large contingent of south Indian priests, mainly Silesians.The earliest presence of missions in the north east, both Catholic and Protestant, was almost incidental. By the early 1800s western missions were seeking an overland route into China, as access through the eastern sea coast of China was becoming more difficult (8). In pursuance of this land route into south western China the Baptists established a short lived mission in Guwahati in 1829, and later a more permanent one further east at Sadiya. The first mission contact with the Naga tribes was in 1838, and the first Naga Christian community was established, by an Assamese evangelist, among the Ao sub-tribe in 1872. Thereafter other groups were gradually contacted and Kohima (present capital of Nagaland) and Wokha became important centres for Christianity among the Angami Nagas. The other main tribal grouping, the Kukis, only began to convert to Christianity in the first decade of the 20th century. Manipur, as an independent princely state was closed to missionaries until after the Anglo-Manipuri war of 1891. Subsequently mission work was permitted only in the hills (over which the British retained some control after the war), but was forbidden among the hinduised plains Meiteis. The first evangelism was carried out among the Tangkhul Nagas in Ukhrul, and subsequently at Kangpokpi (which became a centre for Kuki Christianity).Despite early reluctance Christianity spread among both tribal groups. There was a substantial increase due to the so called Manipur revival which began in 1916. This actually began in the Chin (Lushai) Hills (the present Mizoram) and at first affected mainly the Kukis, but by the 1920s had spread to Manipuri Nagas. In the beginning there was some persecution of Christians by the traditionalists, and mutual suspicion between the Naga subgroups was only slowly broken down. Despite the acceptance of a common faith the age old antagonism between Naga and Kuki continued, fuelled by such anti-colonial movements as the Kuki rebellion and the Jadonong-Gaidinlui cult. While it is true, as Downs (1992:132) indicates, that Christianity has been a unifying factor, it has nonetheless been singularly unsuccessful in eradicating completely inter- and intra-tribal conflict (9). The relationship between the evangelical Baptists of the CBNEI and the Catholics has not been smooth (10).While figures are difficult to assess, there can be no doubt that Christianity has become the ?official religion? (Downs) of Nagaland and Mizoram, and probably 80% of the population of these states would regard themselves as Christian. In Manipur most of the Naga and Kuki tribals, who make up around a third of the population of some 2 million, may also be regarded as Christian. There is also a small, but growing, interest in Christianity among the Meiteis. This may in part be a political, as well as a religious, protest against the Indian mainstream (11). However Manipur, like other parts of the northeast, has been the recipient in recent years of a wholly counterproductive proliferation of fundamentalist splinter groups, usually financed from America, which has resulted in the emergence of a confusing (to the non-Christian) number of mini-churches.Furthermore some of the American financing is being used for purposes quite other than Christian work.
3. POLITICAL RESISTANCE
The area known as the Naga Hills (the present Nagaland less the Tuenseng tract) was only loosely administered by the British. On the independence of India in 1947, Naga leaders made it clear that in their view the Naga people had never historically been part of India and that they did not wish to join the Indian Union. The Hydari agreement (12) recognised their right to develope separately during a ten year period under the general superintendence of the governor of Assam, and that the final decision regarding union or independence would be made thereafter. The Indian Government unilaterally reinterpreted this to mean that after ten years full integration would be effected. Meantime in August 1947 the National Nagaland Council declared independence for the region, and held a plebiscite which gave absolute support for this declaration. India naturally rejected the plebiscite, and the Nagas then boycotted the Indian elections. Nehru paid a flying visit to both Nagaland and Manipur in 1953, but ignored the voice of the people in both states. Integration, master minded by Sirdar Patel and his henchman V.P. Menon, was put into brutal effect. Repressive measures began in 1953. Three years later the Indian army occupied towns and villages, some civilians were shot and their corpses displayed publicly as a warning to insurgents. That same year the NNC set up its rival government. The Indian Government gave some ground. The Tuenseng tract was joined to the Naga Hills in 1956 and the region given some autonomy. Nagaland became the first of the smaller northeastern regions to be granted statehood in 1963.Manipur, meanwhile, despite being able to trace its history as an independent kingdom back nearly two thousand years, and being the first state on the Indian sub-continent to hold full and free elections, was summarily annexed in 1949. It was to be 1972 before Mrs Gandhi bowed to mounting pressure both within and outside Manipur to restore it to full statehood, but now within the Indian Union. Underground insurgent groups, whose origins reach back before 1947, reemerged in the 1960s and remain a potent force (Parratt & Parratt 2000).
In 1972 the NNC and the ?Federal Government of Nagaland? were declared unlawful. The Indian Government negotiated the Shillong Accord with moderates in 1975, and this caused a split within the Naga elite. The National Socialist Council of Nagaland was formed by a group of leaders (including Muivah, a Tangkhul Naga from Ukhrul in Manipur) and went underground as a guerilla organisation. Attacks on Indian army and para-military personnel increased. In-fighting between the insurgent groups took place (often fuelled by ethnic sub-divisions). In 1980 Indian and Myanmar armies inflicted a severe defeat in the NSCN, but it subsequently regrouped and remains a powerful insurgent force. Some attempts, with varying degrees of success, have been made to bring together the chaotic mix of insurgency movements in both northeast India and Myanmar. The situation is however fraught with intra and inter-ethnic rivalries, which have manifested themselves in periodic explosions of violence (eg. the splits in the NSCN and the sporadic flaring up of Naga-Kuki animosity).
4. ATROCITIES COMMITTED BY THE SECURITY FORCES
It is not our purpose in this paper to detail the abuses of human rights which have been perpetrated under the cover of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA see below), and in any case a full inventory of the atrocities committed by the military and paramilitary forces is not possible. Many acts go unreported, especially in rural areas and where victims have neither the education nor political understanding to report them, and in those cases where complaints are made there is hardly ever any redress. India?s ?closed door? policy towards the northeast also means that foreign journalists and human rights workers are kept out, and that reports which appear in the Indian press are often heavily sanitised (13). The local press reports on deaths, disappearances, abuses and protests on a very regular basis, but more often than not blandly and without editorial comment. Abuses are often directed not towards suspects but at innocent civilians, including women and juveniles. Civil rights workers have frequently been targeted in order to attempt to silence them. The Meitei women?s movement, Meira Paibi, (14) has often been met with physical violence on the part of the paramilitaries, even against pregnant and very elderly women. Detailed accounts of the worst abuses are therefore difficult to get access to. However I shall refer subsequently to some of the more public examples to indicate the scale of structural violence. Theses are only a sample of an abuse which involves a continuous depressing catalogue of random shootings of civilians, deaths in custody, disappearances, detainings contrary even to AFSPA, rapes, arrests and torture, all of which occur regularly (15). What characterises almost all cases is that they are simple acts of revenge visited upon an unarmed and non-violent civilian population as revenge for attacks on paramilitaries by insurgency groups. One has to ask whether it has become a policy to attempt to restrain insurgency by the abuse of non-combatants. This is simply, as an AI paper put it, a pattern of violence.
As Pradip Phanjoubam (1999:7) points out, there are two levels of violence in situations such as obtain in Manipur. The higher is the disregard for basic human life on the part of those whose official role should be one of protection, in the illegal detentions, the indiscriminate retaliatory shootings, and other forms of violent physical abuse. This is a structural, or institutional, violence sanctioned by AFSPA (see below). The second level is less overt but just as real. This is the sense of unease which disrupts normal life, business and social activities, in which ?security? forces are seen as agents of an oppressive psychological intimidation and insecurity, which renders a truly human life all but impossible.In 1980, following the deaths of two CRPF (Central Reserve Police Force) personnel in an insurgency attack, the CRPF conducted what the security forces euphemistically term ?sweep? or ?combing? of villages. The inhabitants of Patsoi village, men and women of all ages, were forced to strip naked, over 50 males (some as young as 16, others over 60) were so severely beaten that a number were disfigured for life. Many were subjected to torture, causing three deaths, including one woman. All the livestock was slaughtered, and possession (worth over Rs 1 lakh) were looted. (It was this event that led to the setting up of the Meira Paibi).Four years later, again after an attack on the CRPF, they retaliated by spraying bullets at a crowd watching a football match at Heirangthong in Imphal. 26 spectators were killed.
The CRPF were involved in another massacre in Jan 1995. A group of insurgents fired on the CRPF in the RMC hospital in Imphal. The CRPF called in reinforcements, who arrived after the insurgents had fled. These began firing indiscriminately on hospital staff and bystanders. Of the nine who died one was a medical student, another a cleaner. and six were auto rickshaw drivers. These were shot in two separate incidents. A commission of Inquiry found that none of the victims was armed, two were shot after they had raised their hands and all six rickshaw drivers were taken behind a building and shot at close range; further that all shootings took place after the hostiles had fled, that non-Manipuris (ie Indians from outside the region) were escorted out unmolested, and that the CRPF had uttered the order ?kill all the Manipuris.? The official security forces? report, as is usual, claimed the civilians were killed in cross fire.
Also in 1995 (April) was a massacre in the Nagaland capital Kohima. Incredible as this may seem the Rastriya (National) Rifles mistook a tyre burst in their own convoy for a bomb attack and began firing indiscriminately in the town. The Assam Rifles (another paramilitary) and CRPF hearing the shooting hastened to the scene and joined in. The firing from these security forces lasted for a hour, and resulted in the death of seven innocent civilians and the serious injury to over twenty others. The dead included two young girls (aged 3 and 8) and seven other children were among the injured. Even mortars were used in this attack on a non-existent enemy, though their use in civilian areas is strictly forbidden under army rules.
A more recent massacre took place at Tonsen in October 1999. This was again in retaliation for an earlier attack on the CRPF by the MPA, and again the killings took place after the insurgents had fled the scene. CRPF forces then stopped a bus passing through the area which contained 37 polling officials for a local election (all of course unarmed). They were called out from the vehicle and shot. There were a number of deaths and many were seriously wounded. Also killed were innocent bystanders, including women, and two men who were later dragged from a truck and shot at close range. The disturbances in Imphal as a result of the ill-considered geographical extension of the cease-fire agreement with the Muivah faction of the NSCN resulted, in June 2001, in another fifteen deaths and over two hundred injured.The characteristic feature of all these cases (and they could be multiplied) is that they were not operations conducted against insurgents, but were waged against unarmed civilians, usually long after the insurgents have fled the scene. Perhaps more seriously these are attacks, almost certainly partially racially motivated, by a central security force, which (as we shall see) is not able to be brought to account for its actions.
The most infamous case however concerned the Assam Rifles (another paramilitary) at the Naga village of Oinam in the north Manipur hills. This is one of very few cases in the north east to have been the subject of an Amnesty International report, based largely on the brave witness of Christian Manipuri Naga victims and human rights workers, despite extreme intimidation. Oinam is a very remote village, difficult of access especially in the monsoon season. In July 1982 there was a serious attack on a military post by the NSCN, in which some soldiers were killed and a large quantity of arms stolen. The response from the AR was delayed. Indian official army reports called Operation Bluebird ?a highly disciplined? response under Maj-Gen. P.L.Kukrety, the GOC Manipur Sector. It was in reality anything but that, as the Manipur authorities - after being denied access to a part of their own state for a period - eventually found out. In the sweep 15 civilians were killed in cold blood, four of them being over 50. There was no respect even for the state authorities, one MLA (member of the State parliament) was arrested, the Minister of Education?s house was raided without warrant. In Phuba village 26 people were severly tortured, some sustaining permanent injury, and houses demolished. At Phaibung Khullen a similar number were tortured. Oinam itself suffered the worst. When the state medical officer was permitted to visit the village late in July he found no one: all had been confined for several weeks either in schools or the church, or in the open air. Children, the elderly and pregnant women were not spared; several women gave birth and lost children in these conditions. Numerous women were raped by the AR (one young women later committed suicide), and others compelled to do forced labour for the AR. Many were subjected to torture to extract false confessions and to intimidate them from reporting the violence. Boys as young as 15 were subjected to electric shock torture. Of the 15 persons deliberately murdered, the official post mortems demonstrated that some had been shot at close range (some in the back) and others hanged. Oinam remains an appalling stain on the conscience of the world?s largest democracy, but one which has consistently been denied by the military authorities despite overwhelming evidence.
The military presence is massive. In Manipur for example (a state of around two million) there are ten army battalions (of roughly 1000 men each). There are a comparable number of paramilitary forces. (After the disturbances over the ceasefire agreement in June 2001 it has been calculated that there is in Manipur one armed member of the security forces for every five of the population). Nagaland, with a population of around a million, has a comparable military presence. Of the paramilitaries, the Central Reserve Police Force is probably the most hated, and have a reputation for arrogance and lack of discipline, and they have been responsible for much of the brutalising and killing of civilians. Among their other duties they often guard public buildings, but their inability to speak Manipuri, Nagamese or English, and their general attitude, engenders mistrust on both sides. Besides these there are the Assam Rifles and (on the border) the Border Security Force. The presence of the security forces is felt in all areas of life. Markets and urban streets are patrolled by armed guncarriers as well as footsoldiers, and there is a pervasive sense of an armed presence which, despite its official role, engenders more suspicion and insecurity than confidence. Crucially none of these bodies has any real training to control civil unrest, retaliation rather than confidence building is their usual response.
5. A PERSECUTION OF CHRISTIANS?
The conflict between the Indian security forces and the insurgency groups in the northeast is sometimes portrayed as a persecution of a Christian minority in a country which, though professedly secular, is largely in its mainstream dominated by hinduised values. The high percentage of Christians in the northeast as compared with all other parts of India except Kerala, does indeed on the surface make it look as though there are religious motives involved in the violence perpetrated on civilian populations. This view finds support in that the Delhi Government has from time to time criticised the churches for being anti-Indian. Furthermore churches have often been targetted, and occupied by troops and para-militaries, and even used as places of detention, torture, rape and murder.
In reality, however, the situation is much more complex than this, and ethnicity plays as large a role in the equation as religion. In northeast India, like Myanmar, Thailand and some other SE Asian countries, Christianity was often adopted not by the mainstream of the population but by tribal peoples. Consequently alienation from the mainstream on the ground of ethnicity has tended to be reinforced by a second alienation on the ground of religion. At root the suppression and violation of human rights in north east India is ethnic - it would not be mistaken to call it racial: religious difference has reinforced this.
Nevertheless it is clear that the Naga insurgency movements in India, like the comparable Chin and Karen independence movements in Myanmar, do have to a degree a Christian ideological base. From the beginning Christianity was perceived as a cement which would bring together the various Naga sub-tribes. It was therefore a prominent element in their Naga identity in contrast to what was seen as neo-colonialism by Hindu India. It is significant the Rev Michael Scott, one of the members of the earlier abortive Peace Mission, was widely perceived as being the Nagas? spokesman. Phizo (the first Naga independence leader) was a convinced Baptist. In the earlier period a substantial number of pastors joined the underground. The insurgents did not fight on Sundays unless attacked (Horam 1988:76-77). The slogan ?Nagaland for Christ? was a recognised rallying cry, and to some extent still is. Overtly Christian elements have appeared in official statements. The Constitution of the Federal Government of Nagaland, while it guaranteed free profession and practice of any religion, declared that Christianity would be the religion of the Naga state (Horam 1988:61). It was not averse to using religion as propaganda tool either, when it claimed that the ?Hindu government? of India had adopted a policy of stopping Nagas eating meat. In the earlier days of the movement (Phanjoubam 1993:125) volunteer gospel teams preached under armed guard (one might almost say gun in one hand Bible in the other), and the conduct of the jungle camps was (and to some extent remains, like those in Myanmar) ordered by Christian spiritual activities. As with the non-Christian Meitei movements, the NSCN tended towards puritannical life style, banning alcohol and drugs, and discouraging sexual immorality. Provision of social amenities, like schools and clinics, goes hand in hand with religious teaching. The Naga groups operate not only in Nagaland itself, but frequently recruit and have bases in neighbouring states. The northern hill areas of Manipur have especially been the locations for Naga insurgents? bases and attacks on the security forces.
The Meitei insurgency movements, of course, do not share this Christian factor. Religious protest in their case, such as it is, is tied up with a broad cultural renaissance, which began in the 1930s (Parratt & Parratt 1999).In one sense, of course, the question whether this is religious persecution or not is not the central issue. The violence of the region is essentially a matter of human rights, of the violent suppression of ethnic minorities by state power. This oppression is indeed to some extent random, at the hands of undisciplined troops and paramilitaries, often under officers who either turn a blind eye or are themselves co-perpetrators of violence. The fundamental issue however is not just one of random violence. It is rather that violence against civilians is underpinned by institutional means.
6. STRUCTURAL (INSTITUTIONAL) VIOLENCE
The situation is a result not simply of the inherent sinfulness of individuals and groups, but because the political, legal and social structures permit violence to go unchecked and indeed actively underpin it. Structural (or institutional) violence may be defined as a situation in which the political, social and legal structures are such as to permit, or encourage, the suppression of ethnic, social or religious minorities under the guise of keeping law and order within the state. There are at least three main aspects of structural violence in the northeastern region of India today. These are: (i) the massive presence of so called ?security forces? which prevents the civilian state governments from functioning normally; (ii) the powerlessness of the law courts in the region to bring the security forces to account for abuses, which is exacerbated by procrastination and subservience to the political authority of the central courts; and (iii) the virtual absence of any practical application of human rights agreements. The structure which underlies all these aspects is the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (16).
The designation of Nagaland and Manipur along with other parts of the northeast as ?disturbed areas? has effectively meant that they have been subject to an undeclared state of emergency. This circumscribes not only the liberties of individual citizens, but it also seriously limits the freedom of the State governments. Successive governors of military or police background, and even more the military brigadiers who have overall control of security policy and personnel, have not infrequently acted against the State governments and at times accused them of inaction and even collusion with the insurgents. In effect the State governments have had their teeth drawn and can exist only in uneasy subjection to a hostile central controlling presence. The same may be said of the due processes of law, for security personnel are not subject to normal restraints and cannot be charged under civil law for any acts, however heinous, claimed to have been carried out in the course of their duty. This situation has resulted from the application of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act to the northeast. The origins of this act go back to 1942, and it was intended to enable the British to take action against internal subversion during the Second World war, and it applied throughout India. Like a number of other repressive colonial enactments, it was later used by an independent India to repress what it saw as dissent within its own borders, specifically in the northeastern region. In 1958 it was declared to apply to those areas designated as ?disturbed? in all of present seven states of the northeast, and at that time the Naga Hills and the Ukhrul District of Manipur were so designated. In 1970, 1975, and 1978 the designation ?disturbed areas? was progressively extended over other divisions of Manipur and in September 1980 the whole state was declared a ?disturbed area.? The act has remained in force throughout the states up to the present. The 1958 act (amended in 1972) goes much further than the 1942 British legislation. Crucially, it replaced the term ?emergency? with ?disturbed areas.? Originally the status of ?disturbed area? could only be declared by the particular state government concerned, but in 1972 this power was given to the central Government. As important, however, was the fact that whereas the 1942 act gave special powers under the act only to those with the military rank of captain and above, the 1972 amendment extended this to ?any commissioned officer, warrant officer, non-commissioned officer, or any of equivalent rank? (ie. any soldier except the lowest private). These powers are in effect powers over life and death. They include the right ?to fire upon or otherwise use force, even to the causing of death, on any person who is acting in contravention of any law?; to arrest without warrant anyone suspected of being about to commit an offence; to enter, search and destroy any premises suspected of being used for storing arms; and in each case the soldier ?may use for that purpose force as may be necessary? (AFSPA 1972 (4)). As we have seen ?no prosecution, suit or other legal proceeding shall be instituted, except with the previous sanction of Central Government against any person in respect of anything done or purported to be done in exercise of the powers conferred by this act? (AFSPA 1972 (6) our italics).
Human rights organisations have been powerless to curtail these draconian powers. In 1980 the Human Rights Forum (Manipur) was formed in Delhi and submitted to the Supreme Court (under Public Interest Litigation Process) a petition challenging the legality of AFSPA. Two years later the Naga People?s Movement for Human Rights submitted a similar petition. As is common in India these disappeared down legal black holes, and the latter was not dealt with until November 1997. The Supreme Court ruling upheld the act as constitutional and broadly followed the government line that the act did not grant to the military powers which were excessive, though it did underline the responsibilities of the security forces (especially in surrendering any suspect to the civil police within 24 hours), and issued a series of ?do?s? and ?don?ts.? Such guidelines have little force and are not seldom ignored by the security personnel. The ruling failed to address the crucial issue, that what is essentially emergency legislation intended for times of war (and indeed applied throughout India during the wars with China and Pakistan) has been applied selectively to the northeast region for decades.
7. CHRISTIAN RESPONSES
A context of structural violence is, in Gutierrez?s phrase, a sinful situation. As such it demands a theological response. This response will of course be partially shaped by the fact that a substantial number of those who suffer under this situation are themselves Christians, and there are indications that at the very least in some incidents the security authorities show contempt for churches and Christian spokespersons. However Christian don't have the monopoly of suffering, and as we have seen the abuses are equally directed towards those, like the majority of Meiteis, who are not Christian. Overall the religious affiliation is only one factor, a much greater one is the contempt which is felt by too many in so called Indian mainstream for the Mongoloid northeast as a whole. It is therefore fundamentally an ethnic or racial violence. But whatever the complexities of the situation, any theological response has to speak for all oppressed communities, not just the Christian ones.
While Christians as a whole might be agreed about the nature of a sinful situation they are rarely in agreement as to what to do about it. Sadly theological discussion in the northeast has been constrained almost to the point of non-existence, and structural violence has never been clearly on the theological agenda. One might characterise the widespread attitude as retreat into pietism and a concern with a non-political cultural theology. The only substantial tribal theology to appear from the northeast (and that, one has to say fairly unoriginal) scarcely mentions the issue of oppression (Takatenjen 1998:only at the end of the book on p 140 does he suggest the political situation is the place to start). Even the book edited by Chatterji (1996, of the CISRS, which has been involved in political issues since its inception) only contains a few lines of pious hope for political education. There are no doubt reasons for this. Tribal theology in the northeast is very undeveloped, and much of its thinking is derivative of the North American evangelical Baptist tradition (17). Theological criticism of the Goverment and security forces may also increase the perception of the Church as anti-Indian. However the nettle will have to be grasped sooner rather than later if the church is to have any relevance. A retreat into pietism and a purely cultural theology, coupled with a tacit acceptance of the political status quo, will not do much to address a situation of structural violence which has now operated for over half a century.
Those who followed the South African theological debate on the violations to basic human rights resulting from aparteid, will recall that the essence of the argument of the Kairos Document was that when a government puts in place unjust structures by legislation, backed by the law courts and the security forces, which violate basic human rights, it forfeits its legitimacy. For basic human rights to life also have a theological underpinning, derived from the Christian doctrines of creation and redemption. In such circumstances Christians have the right, even the duty, to resist the illegitimate structures of government. In the South African situation the illegitimacy of government clearly applied to the whole state. In northeast India the position is somewhat different, for the Indian Constitution does in fact grant basic rights to all the population. It could then be argued that what is at stake here is not the illegitimacy of government as a whole, but of that specific legislation (ie AFSPA) which has created structural violence in the states of the northeast.
There are of course those who would argue that the inclusion into India of both Nagaland (which was very loosely administered by the British) and Manipur (which was never administered by them) was a case of neo-colonial annexation (somewhat akin to East Timor). This position, which seems to me to be quite correct from a historical perspective, was of course was the original rationale for the insurgency movements, some of which (though not all) still seek complete independence. Against this must be weighed the question of whether it is not too late to turn the clock back to the pre-1947 situation, and also the practical issue of whether such an agenda is likely to succeed. While it seems to me there may be some theological justification for regarding such an armed struggle as a ?just war,? there does not seem to be a realistic possibility of India letting the smaller states go without appalling bloodshed (unless of course the Indian Union as a whole breaks up, as some more radical political scientists would argue). The most that can be expected is greater autonomy (as happened after a bloody and prolonged insurgency in Mizoram, also mainly Christian). The original vision of the NSCN of an independent Christian state of Nagaland (which, according to some, should be expanded by incorporating much of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh where there are substantial Naga populations) certainly will not do. Despite some gains, the Naga insurgency movements have been riven by dissention and have forfeited much of the claim they had to be regarded as Christian protest movements.
If then the options of an apolitical quiescence and of armed revolution are difficult to defend on theological grounds, what is left? Three other approaches have been tried, those of peace initiatives, of legal constitutional challenge, and of civil disobedience.Peace initiatives go back to the very earliest period after 1947. It was Naga Baptist ministers who urged the Government to set up a Peace Mission in the 1960s. They initiated another Peace Council in 1974, and have from time to time made other individual and collective attempts to broker a peace. None of these has succeeded, partly because of the church?s inability to carry the more extreme radicals with them, partly because Delhi based politicians accused Christian leaders of being too seccessionist. It has been a bitter tight rope for church leaders to walk.
8. LEGAL CHALLENGES AND CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS
Legal challenges to structural violence have been mounted with great regularity, mainly by Human Rights organisations (which of course often include Christians) but also from time to time by church bodies. We have already alluded to the challenges to the legality of AFSPA in the Delhi High Court above, but cases against the security forces have also been brought for specific incidents. The biggest problem, indeed the insuperable problem, here is that AFSPA specifically prevents any case being brought against any member of the forces while in pursuance of his duties unless this is specifically approved by the Central Government. Since permission from Central Government has never been granted, this in effect this means that the security forces are above the civil law. Technically therefore any charges against the security forces, whether of murder, abduction, rape or other forms of violence, can only be tried by court martial, to which civil lawyers cannot easily gain access. This seldom happens even when evidence is overwhelming. In the rare cases when it does occur no report is made public. The opportunities for redress against the armed forces are virtually non-existent. The most the State Governments can do is to order an inquiry. This they have frequently done, though more often than not such inquiries run into the sand or findings are not made public. In cases of detentions and disappearances courts have been asked to order a habeas corpus. This has sometimes produced results, though more often than not the security forces simply claim the detainee was released from their custody. In the many cases where the victims are later discovered murdered responsibility is denied. Claims for compensation do sometimes succeed in the courts, though the judgements are usually ignored by the forces. After the Oinam atrocities, for example the Naga People?s Movement for Human Rights filed petitions against the AR in the High Court in Guwahati and the court directed that detainees should be released and there should be reparations. Shortly thereafter the Manipur Baptist Convention?s Women?s Union filed on behalf of women who had been sexually assaulted and subjected to forced labour. Sometimes Christian women have appealed directly to the source of power, as when the Kohima Women?s Baptist Assembly wrote to Mrs Gandhi protesting against the rape of Naga girls by the 1st Maratha Battalion - an abuse which actually happened in a church. Other cases of a similar nature have been filed in state and High Courts. Compensation, when granted, is usually small, intimidation of witnesses is routine and often brutal, and heavy military presence in uniform at hearings is a further way to silence witnesses. It is to the credit of lawyers and civilians (many of them with little education) that such cases are sometimes won. By and large the legal option runs up against the fact that AFSPA effectively puts the security forces outside the law, however heinous their actions might be.It is this perceived exclusion of civilian victims from recourse to the law where the security forces are concerned that more than anything else has led to widespread alienation from things ?Indian?, for rightly or wrongly the security forces are identified with the Central government. Thus the spiral of violence is given another turn.
9. AFSPA AND HUMAN RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Civil rights groups protest at great risk to their safety. In Manipur these are mainly Meitei (therefore not predominantly Christian). Foremost among them have been the All Manipur Students? Union (which is frequently banned), Civilians Against Atrocities, and most effective of all the Meira Paibi. All these groups have been subjected to banning of peaceful demonstrations, beatings and detentions, and occasional loss of life. It must be emphasised that there are movements elsewhere in India, especially in Delhi, which have taken on up the need to restore human rights in the NE (18). India signed up to the UN agreement on Human Rights in 1991, and three years later stationed a Manipuri Human Rights representative in Imphal. However, his remit is entirely civil, since AFSPA explicitly excludes all security personnel from charges of human rights violations. India also signed the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted by the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights). This committed signatories to ?abrogate legislation leading to impunity for those responsible for grave violations of human rights... and to prosecute such violations, thereby providing a firm basis for the rule of law.? When AFSPA has been subjected to scrutiny and severe criticism by UN committees on human rights India has consistently claimed that AFSPA does not violate basic rights and that it is necessary for the peace of the country as a whole.However AFSPA does blatantly violate international conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Economic and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, the UN Body of Principles for Protection of All Persons Under any form of Detention, and the UN Principles on Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal and Summary Executions. Security forces have also frequently violated sections of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (19).It has also been pointed out that AFSPA violates sections of the Indian Constitution, especially articles 21 (on the right to life) and 22 (protection against arrest), as well as sections of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code.
10. THEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
Human rights are a theological issue. As Moltmann (1997:119) rightly points out, after World War II it has been recognised that the way a country treats its people is not a matter only for the country itself but for all. The excuse of ?not interfering in internal affairs? is no longer a valid defence. The situation today in northeast India is sadly all too common in today?s world despite the plethora of human rights agreements. This paper may not have looked very different if had dealt with Myanmar, Sudan or a dozen other countries where ethnic and religious human rights are being daily violated - except for the very important fact that India claims to be a democracy and has had a long tradition of protest against oppression. Christians in northeast India have largely been left on their own in dealing with the structural violence of their region. I would suggest that this challenge now needs to be taken up at the national level, that is within India, and also at the wider ecumenical level.A couple of decades ago a bombshell was dropped upon the playground of the Indian theologians. The sanskritic tradition of doing Christian theology in India, which indeed had had a long and remarkable history and had occupied some brilliant minds, found itself challenged to the point of being dismissed as irrelevant by the irruption of Dalit theology. The sanskritic theological tradition is actually very little threat to the underlying Hindu culture of India: it uses Hindu concepts, largely obeys Hindu philosophical categories, and is eager for dialogue. Its disadvantage is that it is elitist and largely irrelevant to the majority of Christian, around 70% of whom do not belong to the upper castes. Dalit theology sharply rejected the sanskritic approach. In the political power game dalits also had been, largely against their will, incorporated into the Hindu system as a kind of fifth caste (hence were called by the Indian constitution ?scheduled castes'). Political and religious leaders (including Gandhi) argued strongly for keeping them within the overall socio-religious categories of Hinduism. Significantly the Indian Constitution makes a similar implicit assumption about the tribals by calling them ?scheduled tribes,? and the fluidity between scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in some Indian states is evident from census data. However the tribal peoples of the northeast are different (a fact recognised by Albert Minz:1996). They have never been hinduised and have always been quite distinct from Hindu societies (20). Tribal theology can no more be absorbed by the sanskritic ?mainstream? of Indian theology than tribals themselves can be absorbed into the hinduised cultural mainstream. Nor, despite the common lot of oppression, can tribal theology be subsumed under Dalit theology (as some tribals in the Indian heartland seem to be in danger of doing (notably Nirmal Minz (1994) and James Massey (1999)). A second radical shift in theological thinking in India is demanded, to recognise and indeed to celebrate the fact that a coherent and valid tribal theology will be manifestly different from both the sanskritic and the dalit traditions. But it must build on the long tradition that both have of political involvement - from those who like Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya at the beginning of the century became involved in the independence struggle, through to the Gandhian Christians, the CISRS, and now the dalits. My own feeling, however, is that African theology, which is successfully beginning to marry the cultural with the political agenda, is a rather better mentor (though till now totally neglected) for tribal Christians than anything which has yet emerged from the sub-continent itself.
ABBREVIATIONS
AFSPA Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AR Assam Rifles (para-military armed force)
CBCNEI Council of Baptist Churches in North East India
CISRS Christian Institute for Religion and Society
CRPF Central Reserve Police Force (para-military armed force)
MLA Manipur Legislative Assembly (State Parliament)
MPA Manipur People?s Army
NNC National Nagaland Council
NSCN National Socialist Council of Nagaland
NOTES
1. A point acknowledged by Sunil Khilnani The Idea of India (London 1997).
2. Menon?s highly partisan and sanitised The Integration of the Indian States (New Delhi 1956) is an 'official' history which skates over the real issues of conflict. His date for the absorption of Manipur and Tripura is two years too early.
3. The same holds for some of the tribal hill areas of Burma (Myanmar)which have also experienced similar movements for self-determination since 1947.
4. The northeast is often virtually ignored in standard works on Indian history and politics: this may partly be because access for research is difficult, even for Indians.
5. As long ago as 1980 Sarin (1980:116) could claim that ?of late Meiteis are refusing to be recognised as Hindus?, and the revival of the pre-Hindu Sanamahi religion continues to apace (Parratt & Parratt 1999).
6. It is true that these restrictions (like much other oppressive legislation) built upon colonial regulations, in this case the ?inner line.? The inner line restrictions were originally meant to preserve tribals from exploitation by Indians from the rest of the subcontinent. Its present operation certainly does not succeed in doing that, and there are justifiable complaints (especially from Manipur) that outsiders dominate the economy out of all proportion to their numbers, and flood the region unwanted unskilled labour. The modern version of the inner line, ?restricted areas?, functions simply to prevent outside access to sensitive areas and thus prevent the dissemination in the media of the true conditions in those states.
7. The term ?insurgency? is far from satisfactory, since there is within it the implication of illegitimacy and that the insurgent is an insurrectionist. B.K. Roy Burman (1997:21) rightly points out that ?insurgency is a circuit of reciprocal violence (out italics), where the players are the state establishment and the challengers of the same.? Pakem (1997:3) states that in his informal meetings with leaders of these movements they had never described themselves as ?insurgents? but rather as patriots, freedom fighters, defenders of their people and so on. ?Insurgent? is therefore not a self-designation but a term generally applied by their opponents. A similar problem is raised by the use of the phrase ?security forces.? It is clear that sympathisers of insurgents (whether passive or active) do not regard the military, para-militaries and sometimes the civil police as contributing to their personal security, but rather as sources of institutional violence. The use of both these terms is very problematic. However since this terminology seems to have established itself in the literature I shall use it for the purposes of this paper.
8.There is ample evidence both from early traditions and from documentary sources that a land route through Assam to Yunnan via northern Burma existed from pre-Christian times. There appear to have been two main routes, one through the northern end of the Brahmaputra Valley and another, more southerly route, through the Valley of Manipur, and it was no doubt along these routes that the earliest Mongoloid Thai-Shan settlers to north east India entered.
9. most recently in Kuki-Naga massacres of the 1990s, and the in-fighting among different sub-groups in the NSCN.
10. indeed Syiemlieh (1990:75) claims that a persecution of Catholic Nagas was provoked by the largely Baptist NSCN underground.
11. K.M.Singh (1991:421) rightly points out that the dramatic impact of the Second World War on Manipur had the effect of breaking down the barriers between Hindus and others and bringing the about greater understanding of Christianity on the part of the Meiteis.
12. an agreement made between Sir Akbar Hydari, Governor of Assam, and the Naga leaders.
13. In the 1960s all foreigners were removed, and for long periods admission was very tightly restricted for the whole region. Some areas have more recently been opened up to a degree, but the states of Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal remain virtually closed to non-Indians, and even restricted of access to nationals. These restrictions are rigidly enforced. Permits are technically granted only in Delhi, and the bureaucratic inertia of the Indian civil service usually ensures that applications are seldom responded to. When granted they are commonly valid only for three days, and for cultural visits or for visitation of Allied and Japanese war cemetaries.
14. a women's passive resistance movement against atrocities: see Meira Paibi (in Manipuri; National Research Centre, Imphal 2000).
15. sources: for a list of 147 acts of violence committed between Feb to June 1973 see the MRG report India and the Nagas pp 28-30; the Human Rights Forum, Manipur, paper on Death of Civil Liberties and Democratic Rights in Manipur, Delhi dated 20th Nov 1980 gives other early cases; Tarapot Phanjoubam (1993:147ff) gives a large number of cases in the 1980s; the statement of the UNLF to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Geneva July/Aug 1996 gives a further cases, including ten of custodial deaths; see also Interim Report (dated 26th October 2000) of the Independent People?s Inquiry Commission, Manipur, headed by H. Suresh (Bombay High Court Judge); and several papers of the Committee on Human Rights (COHR) including ?Right to Life? (Imphal 1997) and ?The Killings Continue? (a report on the summary execution of civilians, during 1997), also its National Seminar on Human Rights (Imphal 1994). More recently Manipur Update has begun to document fully abuses, and the journal of the Manipur Research Centre Orient Vision gives a check list of main events.
16. AFSPA was approved despite very strong opposition in Parliament (by members from several different regions of India) on the grounds that it violated fundamental human rights, that it gave what were in effect emergency powers to lower ranking security personnel without the formal declaration of an emergency, and that it was specifically applied only at the northeastern region of India (despite there being equally ?disturbed? areas elsewhere. One of the two Manipuri members of the Lower House in his speech against the bill gave examples of how the armed forces had already been guilty of rape and wanton occupation of churches. The equally draconian Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) was approved in 1985 and applied to large number of states and Union territories. It was extended on four occasions, and a more severe version of the act is currently being considered. This act also violates several aspects of basic human rights.
17. However evangelicals, even the more conservative end of the spectrum, are elsewhere taking a substantial role is seeking to analyze and grapple with political issues, and there is certainly nothing inherent in evangelicalism which makes it any less able than other theological stance to speak prophetically about political issues.18. One of these is the Solidarity Group for the Support of Civil and Democratic Rights Movements in the northeast. Last year Uma Sharma, the exponent of Kathak dance, gave a performance in Imphal in aid of human rights. 19. For an excellent legal assessment of the Act see ?Armed Forces Special Powers Act: a study in national security tyranny? produced by the South Asian Human Rights Documentation Centre (http://members.tripod.com?~TheManipurPage.letters.humanrhts.html). This paper also discusses UN criticisms of the act. The UN International Human Rights Committee (eg. CCPR/C/79/Add.81 4th August 1997) has levelled severe criticisms of India because of AFSPA, and has repeatedly called for security forces to be subject to civil law in cases of abuse of civilians.
20. The Inner Line kept plains Indians out: Nagaland had virtually no contact with Hindus till 1947, Meitei Hindus never made any attempt to hinduise tribals.
21. I am reliably informed that when a delegation of tribal Christians approached one of the directors of the WCC, who was himself an Indian, a few years ago about the problems of the northeastern region his response was dismissive.
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