Manipur: Extortion Rules

Bibhu Prasad

Routray Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi

With 4,383 militancy-related fatalities between 1992 and 2006, Manipur remains the third most violent theatre of conflict in the country, behind Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) and Assam, over this extended period. In more recent times, it has outstripped Assam, with 311 fatalities in 2006, as against Assam's 242; it has, however, in turn been overtaken by the Left Wing insurgency in Chhattisgarh, which resulted in 462 fatalities in 2006.

Apart from the overall insecurity resulting from the threat to and loss of life, Manipur now has one of the most comprehensive networks of terrorist extortion in the country, affecting almost every earning citizen in the State, even as the state and its agencies remain virtually paralysed – with the exception of the Army and Central Paramilitary Forces engaged in a Sisyphean counter-insurgency effort that has done nothing to permanently diminish the intensity or expanse of extremist depredations.

Some 15 militant groups operate in the State, some claiming to represent, on the one hand, the State's majority Meitei community, principally dominating the Imphal Valley, while others professing to speak for the Naga, Kuki and other tribal communities, dominate the Hill areas.

Endemic extortion demands have often triggered tentative and ineffectual protests. Most recently, on June 2 and 3, 2007, pharmacies across Manipur downed their shutters after a militant group demanded INR 10 million as 'tax' from the All Manipur Medical Representatives Association and the All Manipur Pharmaceutical and Druggists Association. The overmanned State Police – Manipur has 535 policemen per 100,000 population against the Indian average of 122 – which plays almost no role in counter-insurgency and has demonstrated neither the will nor the capacity to protect citizens against terrorist excesses, nevertheless saw fit to force open some of the stores on June 4. However, the shutters came down again as soon as the Police left. The pharmacies eventually opened on June 9, after a combination of use of force and assurance of protection by the Police. In the interim, doctors at the Imphal-based Regional Institute of Medical Sciences, the largest hospital in the State, were forced to postpone major surgeries fearing shortage of lifesaving medicines.

Earlier, on May 28, over 100 shops in Imphal's Paona Bazaar, many of them selling smuggled foreign goods, closed down in protest against an extortion demand of INR 1.5 million by an unidentified militant outfit. Shops, however, reopened a day later, following an "agreement involving an unspecified amount" between the owners and the militant outfit. In another incident, on May 23, suspected United National Liberation Front (UNLF) militants abducted a Reliance Telecom engineer in Churachandpur District for the failure to pay an extortion amount of INR Three million.

It has never been easy to do business in Manipur, either for private enterprises or for state agencies. The Government of India-owned Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) shut down its main office located at the Khoyathong locality in capital Imphal between May 21 and June 3 after an extortion demand of INR Two million by an unidentified outfit. The closure of the Imphal office affected about 250,000 policyholders and nearly 1,000 agents of the LIC. In the following week, offices of four other insurance companies — New India Insurance, United Insurance, Oriental Insurance and National Insurance - closed down as well, following similar demands from `unidentified' groups. While the LIC reopened on June 4 after the police urged it to resume business, the remaining agencies remain were gradually nudged open one after another, by the police between June 10 and 12.

The state's collapse is total, and there is no protection even for business establishments operating in the heart of the fortified capital, Imphal, despite the continuous `successes' of continuing military operations. A significant proportion of all Government funds also finds its way into militant coffers, and the insurgents have carried out attacks on the residences of prominent politicians, police and administrative personnel and professionals, as well as on common civilians, in case of any failure to comply.

Despite the very large number of glaring cases of extortion highlighted in regional and, on occasion, national media, the fact is that the bulk of such exactions are concluded in tacit deals, away from the glare or even knowledge of the media. The nature of these secret deals was revealed after the arrest of the UNLF `general secretary' and `finance-in-charge' Narengbam Marjit alias Thabal Singh at Guwahati in neighbouring Assam, on May 1, 2007. INR 4.7 million in cash along with two laptops and a car were recovered from the UNLF leader. The Manipur police subsequently established that top Government officials from Manipur were being summoned to cities outside the State to settle extortion demands made by the UNLF, as well as by other groups.

The border town of Moreh in Chandel District accounts for INR 20 billion in informal and INR 100 million in formal trade between India and Myanmar. The 109 kilometre stretch of National Highway (NH) 39 between Imphal and Moreh, which has been the mainstay of the dwindling trade between the two countries is a major source of insurgent revenues, as well as the location of several incidents of militant violence resulting from a failure to pay or resistance against insurgent `taxes'. On May 19, for instance, cadres of an unidentified militant group forced back all passenger service vehicles, including taxi services, proceeding towards Moreh from Pallel in Chandel. Previously, on May 17, suspected People's United Liberation Front (PULF) militants attacked a passenger bus at Lilong along the Indo-Myanmar road for its failure to pay. The incident led to a day's suspension of passenger services by the Indo-Myanmar Bus Drivers and Owners Association.

New Delhi's `conflict resolution strategy' in neighbouring Nagaland has only added to Manipur's pervasive woes. As the Centre's `ceasefire' with the NSCN-IM approaches a decade without any final settlement, the NSCN-IM appears to have secured a licence to kill and extort on both sides of Nagaland's border with Manipur, and there has been a continuous expansion and consolidation of the Naga insurgent group's in the Hill tracts of Manipur.

Two national highways, NH 39 and NH 53, constitute the link between Manipur and mainland India, through Assam. While NH-39 connects Dimapur in Nagaland with Imphal, NH-53 links Silchar in Assam to Manipur's capital.

For nearly a decade, NH-39 has been under the virtual control of the NSCN-IM, with the outfit establishing 26 permanent collection points along this stretch of road. The mode of `tax' collection at these points is both systematic and elaborate. Worse, NSCN-IM cadres also collude with State Government personnel and are present at many of the Government check posts, where they collect INR 200 against a receipt slip of INR Two and INR 500 against a slip of INR Five from the vehicles. Alternately, drivers can buy up `slips' from various points in Dimapur city and surrounding areas, which are produced at the collection points in order to continue their journey. According to one estimate, every commercial vehicle passing through this route pays out at least INR 4,000 per trip as `taxes' to the NSCN-IM. Truckers who fail to pay the `taxes' and/or produce pre-paid slips are often beaten up and are forced to pay exorbitant `fines'. On many occasions, trucks have been looted or burnt for non-compliance. In April 2007 alone, six trucks were burnt along the Dimapur-Imphal route by the militants. Some collection points have also recently come up in the Karbi Anglong District of Assam, adjoining Dimapur, where the NSCN-IM's influence is substantial.

The Manipur Government's decision to strengthen check points along NH-39 at Sekmai, Kanglatongbi, Senapati, Lairou, Maram, Tadubi, Mao, Sapermeina and Taphou has had limited results. These reinforced points now provide some protection to vehicles that have already been taxed on their way from Dimapur, or are subsequently taxed on their way to Dimapur, once they are outside the protected areas within Manipur. In any event, the NSCN-IM dominates the Hill Districts of Manipur, including Ukhrul, through which the highway winds it way, and beefing up checkpoints does little to dilute this pervasive influence. Indeed, in the month of May, the NSCN-IM went to the extent of intimidating the highest ranking bureaucrat (deputy commissioner) of the Ukhrul District, after he had proposed action against the outfit's extortion network, forcing him to flee to capital Imphal.

Manipur's other lifeline, NH-53, remains mostly unusable as two strategic bridges, Makru and Barak, in their present state, are too fragile to take the weight of goods-laden trucks. New bridges are being built to replace the existing ones. Construction on another transport route, the proposed railway line from Jiribam (along the border with Assam) to Imphal via Tupul (in Tamenglong District), which, it is claimed, will be `invulnerable' to militant influence, is yet to begin. Not only are the poor condition of the road problematic, traffic along NH-53 frequently remains suspended due to strikes announced by numerous student, youth, ethnic and militant organisations that have mushroomed all over the State.

In the face of such overwhelming militant domination, the Government often chooses silence to express its helplessness. Barring an appeal by one of the State's Members of Parliament (MP) in the Lok Sabha (Lower of House of Indian Parliament) Thokchom Meinya Singh and State Information Minister T.N. Haokip to the militant to `shun violence', for instance, the Ibobi Singh-led Government failed to react to pharmacies' shut-down. Even Health Secretary P. Vaiphei was quoted by the local media as stating that he came to know of the developments only through newspaper reports! The reaction is unsurprising in view of the extended record of the sheer spinelessness of the State Government. In 2005, for instance, the headquarters of the Taxation Department in Imphal was locked down for weeks after the militant slapped huge extortion demands on the officials. It is not clear whether a secret `settlement' was reached with the militants before the department resumed its activities. In late May 2007, in a further abdication of responsibility, the State Government came up with an outrageous proposal to ease gun licensing procedures in order to allow civilians to keep arms to `counter militant violence'. The proposal has since elicited intense opposition from several civil society groups. On May 30, 2007, a five-member team led by the Director General of the Government of India's Central Economic Intelligence Department visited Imphal to help Manipur formalise steps against money laundering, but little can be expected, since even the Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2005, is yet to be enforced in Manipur, and it would take a near miracle for the provisions of the Act to take effect and to deliver the intended results.

Manipur's tragic and sustained downward spiral continues, reinforced by the collapse of the State Government, and the Centre's manifest lethargy in evolving an effective strategy of recovery. Interestingly, none of the militant groups in the State appears to be fighting to win in terms of any of their political objectives. The survival of the groups at current or marginally augmented strengths, the defence of their `spheres of influence' and `dominance' against sporadic Security Force onslaughts and internecine strife, and the `management' of the networks of extortion, have become ends in themselves. A kleptocracy reigns across Manipur, both through the State Government and through the exactions of the militants. For the common people there is no relief in sight.

Source: http://www.mediaforfreedom.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=574 , accessed 19 June 2007