Written by Thangkhanlal Ngaihte
Saturday, 21 July 2007
One defining feature of the communal violence recently witnessed in and around Moreh is that while the Meitei people were insistent on the removal of central forces (in this case, the Assam Rifles), the Kuki people were equally adamant that they stay [I understand there will be people who would argue that the conflict is only between the UNLF and KNA, but I believe that’s disingenuous].
The underground UNLF itself and other Meitei bodies like the Meira Paibi and Meitei Council Moreh (MCM) alleged unhealthy collusion between the Kuki militants and Rifles against them and made the latter’s removal a condition for agreeing to peace. The Kuki side–from the KNA to KSO to Hill Tribal Council (HTC)–was, on the other hand, vehemently against the deployment of state forces (in this case, the IRB) in place of the Assam Rifles.
This diametrically opposite position held by the two sides holds more significance than meets the eye. Because, beneath it one can glimpse a seeming incompatibility: a situation in which one’s enemy becomes another’s friend by virtue of that. It gives the lie to the CM, Ibobi Singh’s rhetorical assertion that there was nothing communal in the conflict. It also shows that attempts to project the conflict as only between two underground militants is more of wishful thinking than acceptance of reality.
The fact, simply, is that while the Meiteis saw the Assam Rifles as acting at the tribal’s behest (and if they act at the tribal’s behest, it cannot be good for the Meiteis, right?), the Kuki people saw the same central forces as a bulwark against Meitei domination. The Kukis, rightly or wrongly, see the state forces as representing Meitei interests. The distrust is so deep that when an IRB personnel, who belongs to Kuki tribe, died of gunshot wounds at the height of the conflict, there were open allegations that the killing was an inside job. There is, thus, no getting away from the fact that the fissure between the plain and the hill lays deep and symbolic gestures like peace rallies and MoUs will not do to mend it.
This mutual distrust is neither recent nor isolated. The Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee report on the AFSPA was categorical that the AFSPA be scrapped. But it is equally emphatic that the Army continues to be deployed in the region, which it said was ‘the overwhelming desire of the overwhelming majority of the region’. A majority opinion within the Meitei community, then and now, is that the AFSPA should go and along with it, the Army. An overwhelming majority of the Kuki-Zomi tribals, then and now, believes that they just wouldn’t be able to do without the Army. Even if the atrocious Act is scrapped, the Army should stay.
Why would the tribal people love the Army so much? I had dealt with this issue in these columns earlier, but this bears repeating.
Source: http://www.zogam.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1308&Itemid=32
Saturday, 21 July 2007
One defining feature of the communal violence recently witnessed in and around Moreh is that while the Meitei people were insistent on the removal of central forces (in this case, the Assam Rifles), the Kuki people were equally adamant that they stay [I understand there will be people who would argue that the conflict is only between the UNLF and KNA, but I believe that’s disingenuous].
The underground UNLF itself and other Meitei bodies like the Meira Paibi and Meitei Council Moreh (MCM) alleged unhealthy collusion between the Kuki militants and Rifles against them and made the latter’s removal a condition for agreeing to peace. The Kuki side–from the KNA to KSO to Hill Tribal Council (HTC)–was, on the other hand, vehemently against the deployment of state forces (in this case, the IRB) in place of the Assam Rifles.
This diametrically opposite position held by the two sides holds more significance than meets the eye. Because, beneath it one can glimpse a seeming incompatibility: a situation in which one’s enemy becomes another’s friend by virtue of that. It gives the lie to the CM, Ibobi Singh’s rhetorical assertion that there was nothing communal in the conflict. It also shows that attempts to project the conflict as only between two underground militants is more of wishful thinking than acceptance of reality.
The fact, simply, is that while the Meiteis saw the Assam Rifles as acting at the tribal’s behest (and if they act at the tribal’s behest, it cannot be good for the Meiteis, right?), the Kuki people saw the same central forces as a bulwark against Meitei domination. The Kukis, rightly or wrongly, see the state forces as representing Meitei interests. The distrust is so deep that when an IRB personnel, who belongs to Kuki tribe, died of gunshot wounds at the height of the conflict, there were open allegations that the killing was an inside job. There is, thus, no getting away from the fact that the fissure between the plain and the hill lays deep and symbolic gestures like peace rallies and MoUs will not do to mend it.
This mutual distrust is neither recent nor isolated. The Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee report on the AFSPA was categorical that the AFSPA be scrapped. But it is equally emphatic that the Army continues to be deployed in the region, which it said was ‘the overwhelming desire of the overwhelming majority of the region’. A majority opinion within the Meitei community, then and now, is that the AFSPA should go and along with it, the Army. An overwhelming majority of the Kuki-Zomi tribals, then and now, believes that they just wouldn’t be able to do without the Army. Even if the atrocious Act is scrapped, the Army should stay.
Why would the tribal people love the Army so much? I had dealt with this issue in these columns earlier, but this bears repeating.
Source: http://www.zogam.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1308&Itemid=32
