By Donn Morgan Kipgen
The peaceful demise of the NSCN(IM)’s senior-most original tactical commander S/S Col Livingstone Tangkhul, with his boots-off, in Ukhrul district on 12th September 2007, has left a big hole in a long fought insurgency movement of the Nagas in Manipur range. His tactical achievements in field combats during his heydays, the end results notwithstanding, like S/S Maj T James Kipgen of the Kuki National Front (KNF), with audacious precision strikes and mental courage, would be almost unsurpassable. Simple and known to be soft-spoken, military-minded as he was, ‘Col’ Livingstone must have to be the tactical commander who strategically lifted the military might of the NSCN(IM) to its highest fighting force to reckon with. Of course, his fellow field commanders like ‘Brig’ Atem, Ramkhating, etc. might have been a part of the NSCN(IM) strike force who put the fear of God in the minds of the State police, MR and central paramilitary forces in the mid-1980s, but Mr T Linvingstone lived up to his name by keeping a low profile with high profile tactical achievements. Since he was the top most commander of the ‘much-feared’ NSCN(IM), three of the most audacious and successful ambushes and one unparalleled arms-looting i.e. decamping of as many as 95 SLRs about four LMGs, 10 Sten Carbines, pistols and mortars, HF radios, plus over 2000 rds of assorted ammos at the Naga Oinam’s AR post with Machiavellian ruse works, ought to be rightfully attributed to this Tangkhul-Naga warrior too. Unfortunately, nine AR jawans, including a JCO, were hacked to death with hands tied. What happened in the aftermath was unrecorded history.
He seemed to have no personal hatred to the Kukis as a whole though things might have changed otherwise drastically. Mr Livingstone was said to be one of the first UG outfits’ commanders to introduce the then princely Kalashnikovs and M-16 amongst the NE UG fraternity. And it was during his strong leadership period when the NSCN(IM) militants killed as many as 25 or more armed forces personnel in three stunning and bloody ambushes. Another 34 jawans of AR and BRTF were unceremoniously mowed by suspected NSCN(IM) about 10 years back in Tamenglong district with a same precision strikes and tactical set up. In insurgency movement and CI OPs, it is the number of dead bodies and arms looted or recovered that really matters most, an open example of achievement, as long as the victims are not civilians or unarmed persons. Everything is free and fair in war and love, and the killings are not inhuman nor ungodly in real gun-battles, armed encounters and conventional ambushes, etc. However, any type of avoidable killings on any purpose has to be condoned and condemned by one and all, especially in strict Christian tradition.
Since the name of the late Livingstone was quite conspicuous by its absence during the bloody Kuki-Naga ethnic war, it is hard to pass any judgment upon his political role as an influential NSCN(IM) senior commander. It would be very interesting for any research scholar to know whether he was instrumental in keeping most of the proper Ukhrul district areas calm and peaceful amidst gruesome killings in all other Naga-inhabited areas. He was still a respectable force to be reckoned with at that crucial time period. But then, past is past and ‘Col’ Livingstone alone could not single-handedly changed the course of that horrific ethnic war. However, Mr Livingstone definitely has a rightful place among the best of UG outfit’s commanders in the history of NE insurgency movement. As for his life after death, only the Almighty God has the right to pass judgment for his deeds on earth. Though he might not have any direct hand nor authorised the gory massacres during the Kuki-Naga ethnic war, it was sincerely more appropriate for him to pass away peacefully a couple of day before 13th September, since the 13th day of September is observed as the Black Day of the Kukis.
In time honoured military Code of Honour, a fitting tribute has to be given for his real combat achievements and for his dedication to the cause of the Naga Nation in two different insurgency movements. His factual activities and status ought to be put together in full details, both the good and the bad parts, by learned Naga military researchers along with other past NSCN(IM)’s top commanders. The rise of ‘Col’ Livingstone, ‘Maj Gen’ Atem, Th Muivah and SS Khaplang etc in Manipur insurgency movements coincided with the rise of one Ahanthem Romen Kumar, SP of Imphal dist, then MPS officer and young SIs N Lokhon and Mobi, ASIs Krishnatombi, Rajen etc which saw the formation of a strike force called ‘police commandos’ armed only with 9mm pistols, Sten Carbines and .303 rifles for other ranks. At that time, the most well-known PLA commander was one Temba, whose Kuki-wife, Mary was interned at the Leimakhong Army’s prison. The professional relationship between the then CM of Manipur, Shri Rishang Keishing, also on the rise, with the then SP, Imphal, A Romenkumar (now IPS, IG L/O 1) was rather quite similar to this present CM of Manipur and the SP, Imphal-West, in all technical aspects pertaining to revitalisation of the State’s capital law-enforcement. Whatsoever the other professional records might be, Shri Romenkumar Singh, IPS, one of the most decorated police officers in India, should be given the hard earned credit for forming the now much-feared Manipur Police Commandos. Those who ought to be honoured, has to be sincerely honoured.
At present Mr Livingstone had left behind a well-respected UG militant outfit i.e the NSCN(IM), in its most uncertain and tumultuous hours at the hands of two powerful Naga UG leaders. His high-flying strike forces warriors which created a terror in the minds of his enemy have now been grounded for nearly 10 years period without combat experiences since the signing of Ceasefire with the GOI. Without any major arms procurement, training and recruitments, military exercises, etc, the NSCN(IM) would be hard pressed to drive home their once powerful voice if there has to be any full scale counter-offensive against the GOI, as once hinted clearly by the NSCN(IM) Supremo, Th Muivah. During an interview with Jonathan Head, then Correspondent, BBC South-East Asia, on 5th July, 2001, asked ‘if the NSCN(IM) would be prepared to go back to the armed struggle’, Mr Th Muivah swiftly replied: ‘Yes we are bound (sic), there is no other option. If the Indian Govt would betray us, we cannot honour them and there is no (other) solution whatsover. We have to honour our own commitment, they must also honour their own commitment. Then there can (only) be mutual trust between us, so the Peace (talk) would go smoothly. Otherwise it is meaningless to talk. We can fight. Naturally, we will be forced to go back to square one’. Well, that was about 6 years ago, but the situation is pretty quite different now. The GOI’s representatives have virtually tried to run down the clock upon the ageing and the older NSCN(IM) leadership. Time is running out for them after all these years but not a single peaceful or ‘profitable’ argument has been signed officially between the GOI and NSCN(IM) till now. The question is blowing in the wind. Will they or won’t they? With the ever stronger NSCN(K) on open war-path and so intimidating with equal fire-power, things are not as rosy and calm as they se-em to be. Anything could happen if not tackle well.
The Sangai Express
The peaceful demise of the NSCN(IM)’s senior-most original tactical commander S/S Col Livingstone Tangkhul, with his boots-off, in Ukhrul district on 12th September 2007, has left a big hole in a long fought insurgency movement of the Nagas in Manipur range. His tactical achievements in field combats during his heydays, the end results notwithstanding, like S/S Maj T James Kipgen of the Kuki National Front (KNF), with audacious precision strikes and mental courage, would be almost unsurpassable. Simple and known to be soft-spoken, military-minded as he was, ‘Col’ Livingstone must have to be the tactical commander who strategically lifted the military might of the NSCN(IM) to its highest fighting force to reckon with. Of course, his fellow field commanders like ‘Brig’ Atem, Ramkhating, etc. might have been a part of the NSCN(IM) strike force who put the fear of God in the minds of the State police, MR and central paramilitary forces in the mid-1980s, but Mr T Linvingstone lived up to his name by keeping a low profile with high profile tactical achievements. Since he was the top most commander of the ‘much-feared’ NSCN(IM), three of the most audacious and successful ambushes and one unparalleled arms-looting i.e. decamping of as many as 95 SLRs about four LMGs, 10 Sten Carbines, pistols and mortars, HF radios, plus over 2000 rds of assorted ammos at the Naga Oinam’s AR post with Machiavellian ruse works, ought to be rightfully attributed to this Tangkhul-Naga warrior too. Unfortunately, nine AR jawans, including a JCO, were hacked to death with hands tied. What happened in the aftermath was unrecorded history.
He seemed to have no personal hatred to the Kukis as a whole though things might have changed otherwise drastically. Mr Livingstone was said to be one of the first UG outfits’ commanders to introduce the then princely Kalashnikovs and M-16 amongst the NE UG fraternity. And it was during his strong leadership period when the NSCN(IM) militants killed as many as 25 or more armed forces personnel in three stunning and bloody ambushes. Another 34 jawans of AR and BRTF were unceremoniously mowed by suspected NSCN(IM) about 10 years back in Tamenglong district with a same precision strikes and tactical set up. In insurgency movement and CI OPs, it is the number of dead bodies and arms looted or recovered that really matters most, an open example of achievement, as long as the victims are not civilians or unarmed persons. Everything is free and fair in war and love, and the killings are not inhuman nor ungodly in real gun-battles, armed encounters and conventional ambushes, etc. However, any type of avoidable killings on any purpose has to be condoned and condemned by one and all, especially in strict Christian tradition.
Since the name of the late Livingstone was quite conspicuous by its absence during the bloody Kuki-Naga ethnic war, it is hard to pass any judgment upon his political role as an influential NSCN(IM) senior commander. It would be very interesting for any research scholar to know whether he was instrumental in keeping most of the proper Ukhrul district areas calm and peaceful amidst gruesome killings in all other Naga-inhabited areas. He was still a respectable force to be reckoned with at that crucial time period. But then, past is past and ‘Col’ Livingstone alone could not single-handedly changed the course of that horrific ethnic war. However, Mr Livingstone definitely has a rightful place among the best of UG outfit’s commanders in the history of NE insurgency movement. As for his life after death, only the Almighty God has the right to pass judgment for his deeds on earth. Though he might not have any direct hand nor authorised the gory massacres during the Kuki-Naga ethnic war, it was sincerely more appropriate for him to pass away peacefully a couple of day before 13th September, since the 13th day of September is observed as the Black Day of the Kukis.
In time honoured military Code of Honour, a fitting tribute has to be given for his real combat achievements and for his dedication to the cause of the Naga Nation in two different insurgency movements. His factual activities and status ought to be put together in full details, both the good and the bad parts, by learned Naga military researchers along with other past NSCN(IM)’s top commanders. The rise of ‘Col’ Livingstone, ‘Maj Gen’ Atem, Th Muivah and SS Khaplang etc in Manipur insurgency movements coincided with the rise of one Ahanthem Romen Kumar, SP of Imphal dist, then MPS officer and young SIs N Lokhon and Mobi, ASIs Krishnatombi, Rajen etc which saw the formation of a strike force called ‘police commandos’ armed only with 9mm pistols, Sten Carbines and .303 rifles for other ranks. At that time, the most well-known PLA commander was one Temba, whose Kuki-wife, Mary was interned at the Leimakhong Army’s prison. The professional relationship between the then CM of Manipur, Shri Rishang Keishing, also on the rise, with the then SP, Imphal, A Romenkumar (now IPS, IG L/O 1) was rather quite similar to this present CM of Manipur and the SP, Imphal-West, in all technical aspects pertaining to revitalisation of the State’s capital law-enforcement. Whatsoever the other professional records might be, Shri Romenkumar Singh, IPS, one of the most decorated police officers in India, should be given the hard earned credit for forming the now much-feared Manipur Police Commandos. Those who ought to be honoured, has to be sincerely honoured.
At present Mr Livingstone had left behind a well-respected UG militant outfit i.e the NSCN(IM), in its most uncertain and tumultuous hours at the hands of two powerful Naga UG leaders. His high-flying strike forces warriors which created a terror in the minds of his enemy have now been grounded for nearly 10 years period without combat experiences since the signing of Ceasefire with the GOI. Without any major arms procurement, training and recruitments, military exercises, etc, the NSCN(IM) would be hard pressed to drive home their once powerful voice if there has to be any full scale counter-offensive against the GOI, as once hinted clearly by the NSCN(IM) Supremo, Th Muivah. During an interview with Jonathan Head, then Correspondent, BBC South-East Asia, on 5th July, 2001, asked ‘if the NSCN(IM) would be prepared to go back to the armed struggle’, Mr Th Muivah swiftly replied: ‘Yes we are bound (sic), there is no other option. If the Indian Govt would betray us, we cannot honour them and there is no (other) solution whatsover. We have to honour our own commitment, they must also honour their own commitment. Then there can (only) be mutual trust between us, so the Peace (talk) would go smoothly. Otherwise it is meaningless to talk. We can fight. Naturally, we will be forced to go back to square one’. Well, that was about 6 years ago, but the situation is pretty quite different now. The GOI’s representatives have virtually tried to run down the clock upon the ageing and the older NSCN(IM) leadership. Time is running out for them after all these years but not a single peaceful or ‘profitable’ argument has been signed officially between the GOI and NSCN(IM) till now. The question is blowing in the wind. Will they or won’t they? With the ever stronger NSCN(K) on open war-path and so intimidating with equal fire-power, things are not as rosy and calm as they se-em to be. Anything could happen if not tackle well.
The Sangai Express
