By Don Morgan
Yet another full-scale Military Operations along the Indo- Burma border areas and against other UG Militants’ safe havens been launched by the Army/AR since last week. This well-planned Winter Offensive unleashed against the MPLF is a very all-clear sign that the much hyped operation All Clear was a tactical failure since the firepower of the valley based Militant outfits has been on the rise. The dreaded operation Sunny Vale of the mid-1990s in the valley areas of Mani-pur did not bring forth bright results as desired. If not well-executed and well-co-ordinated, even the big-gest Military Operations with state-of-art arms and equipment could or did go haywire. Man power and Military resources are not the real recipes for success. The tactical prowess, sense of reasoning and the enterprising mindset of field commanders in Military history have proved that numerical superiority and sophisticated weapon-ries were just numbers and advanced machineries without teeth. Military Operations are of two kind: local and general, both have been used in NE India without desirable effects, at times tactical failures. It should be noted that an all-round co-ordinated combined operations with the State paramilitary or special task force had never been conducted in NE India. No wonder all high profile Military Operations have come to nought; the Achilles heels being the break down in the official chain of command. A combined task force is needed to give a hammer blow, certainly not an occasional punch in the form of highly pompous noise but little sting. If three winter military offensives had been dried out of by summer bloom of insurgency, could a fourth survive to meet the sunlight of autumn morning ? Till now nothing can be said about the ongoing military operations to flush out, or search and destroy UG activities and the base camps since its only a week long period with the official absence of specific operational code name, this winter offensive CI//CT ops in border areas can be dubbed as “Operation Burma Tour” for public convenience.
‘The Operation Burma Tour (OBT)’ is the biggest military operations laun-ched by the HQ IGAR(S), with direct support from selected units of the Army’s 57th Mtn Div., in the State of Manipur. Both the HQ IGAR(S) and the 57th Mtn Dv. are under direct supervision of the GOC, 3rd Corps, Lt, Gen. Dadwal Singh when it comes to CI//CT Ops. The IGAR(s) Maj. Gen. B.K. Chengappa is the Theatre Commander. Pressed into actions are the units of 9th, 26th, 27th and 10th AR Sectors (=Army brigade) and extra elements of the elite 21st Field Parachute, 17th J&k LI, 10th J&K Rifles, 5/8th Gorkhas, 6th Jat, 11th Mahars , 22nd Maratha LI, Rajputana Rifles, etc.
As things stand, there seems to be nondesig-nated Field Commander (Filco) like that of the successful Operation Karang wherein Maj. Gen. DD Dwevidi, then GOC , 57th Mtn Div, personally directed the month long CI Ops from Sendra Tourist Lodge, Bn HQ of 11th Garhwal Rifles, about 70 km from his Div. HQ.Gen. Dwevidi, like a true Filco, had done a (Erwin) Rommel, standing tall within mortar and sniper range to see his operational script run it through . The then IGAR(S) Maj. Gen. B.S. Ghotra was a soldier’s general since he would promptly raced to major encounter sites even before the smokes cleared off which tremendously boost the fighting morale of his officers and all ranks. It is most likely that the Sector Commanders of the AR would be designate/used as Filcos to keep up the momentum and logistically consolidate what have been secured. Uptil now OBT has not earned physical success since there has not been creditable body counts plus captures of sophisticated weapons of the MPLF and other UG militant outfits. Because of the geo-topographical conditions and heavy presence of IEDs and landmines, troop movement must have been one hell of a logistical and tactical nightmares. Since the decisive Element of Surprise and swift movement has been lost, it would be rather hard for the Military to fulfil their tactical thrust as pre-planned and press home their psychological advantage. With a numerical superiority ratio of atleast 1.15, speed, firepower, mental courage and sound sense of tactical improvisation are needed to attain commendable operational success. The total strength of UG Militant outfits in these particular areas of military operations could not have been more than 500-600 regular armed cadres with AK, M-16/M-4, SLR, MMG, UMG, RPG, 30MM rockets, 2/3 in mortars, etc. as tactical weapons.
Whereas about 4000 to 5000 troops would surely have been pressed into service by now to search, capture, control or destroy mobile, forward base camps and other safe havens used by the militants. The smallness and mobility of the UG militants is a major disadvantage to the well-co-ordinated but slow moving multiple columns of the well-armed troops in these God forsaken areas. But the most visible disadvantage for the military is the fact that the Burmese border guards and forward miliary HQs are not as helpful as it was during the stinging Operations Blue Bird and Thunderbird. In those highly successful joint military operations land forces with the support of helicopter- borne tactical assault brigade of the Indian Army killed over 100 well-armed militants and the other fleeing militants were killed or captured by the Burmese Army. Around 150-200 UG of various outfits were injured, captures or missing in action in border areas in those two land-air assaults about 12 years ago. But now the script is totally different since the Burmese army officers and ranks are reportedly being paid regular “Protection Fees” by the MPLF, hence the swift easy retreat without fear whenever the Army/ AR went on the 3-pronged assault offensive in border areas. And so the real need for chopper-borne Para(SF) units to cut off the repeated retreats of the overwhelmed UG militants, or to put it diplomatically, to block and negate the “Retrospective Manoeuvres” played by the MPLF militants so successfully.
There has to be a contingency plan, alternative tactic and improvisation to gain operational successes.
This time around the massive Army/AR winter military-offensive conducted under the aegis of the GOC, 3rd Corps through the over all command and control of the IGAR(S) must have to make morale-boosting impact on the going CI/CT Ops in Manipur.
The fact that many tranportable routes, hunting trails and approached roads of the interior border arteas have been successfully cleared off IED booby-traps and anti-personnel landmines by the Military Sappers and securing hostile locations, though highly commendable and appreciable, alone cannot be described as military successes. Indeed, the swift retreats and tactical set-backs suffered so far by the cornered-UG Militants in 4 or 5 forward base camps and half a dozen transit points are just the beginning of big things to come if the present tempo and the all-out operational momentum are militico-diplomatically maintain with full responsibility and proper Chain of Command and Control.
This type of Military Winter Offensive usually atleast 3 months, upto February, 2008 or farther more, according to the real nature of it success. Now is the time to wait and see whether this offensive has the power-punch and requisite resources to rise to the grand occasion.
P.S. I sincerely wish the Hon’ble CM of Manipur, Shri O.Ibobi Singh, a speedy recovery and the best of good health.
Source: The Sangai Express
Yet another full-scale Military Operations along the Indo- Burma border areas and against other UG Militants’ safe havens been launched by the Army/AR since last week. This well-planned Winter Offensive unleashed against the MPLF is a very all-clear sign that the much hyped operation All Clear was a tactical failure since the firepower of the valley based Militant outfits has been on the rise. The dreaded operation Sunny Vale of the mid-1990s in the valley areas of Mani-pur did not bring forth bright results as desired. If not well-executed and well-co-ordinated, even the big-gest Military Operations with state-of-art arms and equipment could or did go haywire. Man power and Military resources are not the real recipes for success. The tactical prowess, sense of reasoning and the enterprising mindset of field commanders in Military history have proved that numerical superiority and sophisticated weapon-ries were just numbers and advanced machineries without teeth. Military Operations are of two kind: local and general, both have been used in NE India without desirable effects, at times tactical failures. It should be noted that an all-round co-ordinated combined operations with the State paramilitary or special task force had never been conducted in NE India. No wonder all high profile Military Operations have come to nought; the Achilles heels being the break down in the official chain of command. A combined task force is needed to give a hammer blow, certainly not an occasional punch in the form of highly pompous noise but little sting. If three winter military offensives had been dried out of by summer bloom of insurgency, could a fourth survive to meet the sunlight of autumn morning ? Till now nothing can be said about the ongoing military operations to flush out, or search and destroy UG activities and the base camps since its only a week long period with the official absence of specific operational code name, this winter offensive CI//CT ops in border areas can be dubbed as “Operation Burma Tour” for public convenience.
‘The Operation Burma Tour (OBT)’ is the biggest military operations laun-ched by the HQ IGAR(S), with direct support from selected units of the Army’s 57th Mtn Div., in the State of Manipur. Both the HQ IGAR(S) and the 57th Mtn Dv. are under direct supervision of the GOC, 3rd Corps, Lt, Gen. Dadwal Singh when it comes to CI//CT Ops. The IGAR(s) Maj. Gen. B.K. Chengappa is the Theatre Commander. Pressed into actions are the units of 9th, 26th, 27th and 10th AR Sectors (=Army brigade) and extra elements of the elite 21st Field Parachute, 17th J&k LI, 10th J&K Rifles, 5/8th Gorkhas, 6th Jat, 11th Mahars , 22nd Maratha LI, Rajputana Rifles, etc.
As things stand, there seems to be nondesig-nated Field Commander (Filco) like that of the successful Operation Karang wherein Maj. Gen. DD Dwevidi, then GOC , 57th Mtn Div, personally directed the month long CI Ops from Sendra Tourist Lodge, Bn HQ of 11th Garhwal Rifles, about 70 km from his Div. HQ.Gen. Dwevidi, like a true Filco, had done a (Erwin) Rommel, standing tall within mortar and sniper range to see his operational script run it through . The then IGAR(S) Maj. Gen. B.S. Ghotra was a soldier’s general since he would promptly raced to major encounter sites even before the smokes cleared off which tremendously boost the fighting morale of his officers and all ranks. It is most likely that the Sector Commanders of the AR would be designate/used as Filcos to keep up the momentum and logistically consolidate what have been secured. Uptil now OBT has not earned physical success since there has not been creditable body counts plus captures of sophisticated weapons of the MPLF and other UG militant outfits. Because of the geo-topographical conditions and heavy presence of IEDs and landmines, troop movement must have been one hell of a logistical and tactical nightmares. Since the decisive Element of Surprise and swift movement has been lost, it would be rather hard for the Military to fulfil their tactical thrust as pre-planned and press home their psychological advantage. With a numerical superiority ratio of atleast 1.15, speed, firepower, mental courage and sound sense of tactical improvisation are needed to attain commendable operational success. The total strength of UG Militant outfits in these particular areas of military operations could not have been more than 500-600 regular armed cadres with AK, M-16/M-4, SLR, MMG, UMG, RPG, 30MM rockets, 2/3 in mortars, etc. as tactical weapons.
Whereas about 4000 to 5000 troops would surely have been pressed into service by now to search, capture, control or destroy mobile, forward base camps and other safe havens used by the militants. The smallness and mobility of the UG militants is a major disadvantage to the well-co-ordinated but slow moving multiple columns of the well-armed troops in these God forsaken areas. But the most visible disadvantage for the military is the fact that the Burmese border guards and forward miliary HQs are not as helpful as it was during the stinging Operations Blue Bird and Thunderbird. In those highly successful joint military operations land forces with the support of helicopter- borne tactical assault brigade of the Indian Army killed over 100 well-armed militants and the other fleeing militants were killed or captured by the Burmese Army. Around 150-200 UG of various outfits were injured, captures or missing in action in border areas in those two land-air assaults about 12 years ago. But now the script is totally different since the Burmese army officers and ranks are reportedly being paid regular “Protection Fees” by the MPLF, hence the swift easy retreat without fear whenever the Army/ AR went on the 3-pronged assault offensive in border areas. And so the real need for chopper-borne Para(SF) units to cut off the repeated retreats of the overwhelmed UG militants, or to put it diplomatically, to block and negate the “Retrospective Manoeuvres” played by the MPLF militants so successfully.
There has to be a contingency plan, alternative tactic and improvisation to gain operational successes.
This time around the massive Army/AR winter military-offensive conducted under the aegis of the GOC, 3rd Corps through the over all command and control of the IGAR(S) must have to make morale-boosting impact on the going CI/CT Ops in Manipur.
The fact that many tranportable routes, hunting trails and approached roads of the interior border arteas have been successfully cleared off IED booby-traps and anti-personnel landmines by the Military Sappers and securing hostile locations, though highly commendable and appreciable, alone cannot be described as military successes. Indeed, the swift retreats and tactical set-backs suffered so far by the cornered-UG Militants in 4 or 5 forward base camps and half a dozen transit points are just the beginning of big things to come if the present tempo and the all-out operational momentum are militico-diplomatically maintain with full responsibility and proper Chain of Command and Control.
This type of Military Winter Offensive usually atleast 3 months, upto February, 2008 or farther more, according to the real nature of it success. Now is the time to wait and see whether this offensive has the power-punch and requisite resources to rise to the grand occasion.
P.S. I sincerely wish the Hon’ble CM of Manipur, Shri O.Ibobi Singh, a speedy recovery and the best of good health.
Source: The Sangai Express
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